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WHO DECIDES IF THERE IS "TRIUMPH IN THE ULTIMATE
AGONY?"' CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND THE
EMERGING RIGHT TO DIE WITH DIGNITY
I went to the woods because I wished to live deliberately, to
front only the essential facts of life, and see if I could not
learn what it had to teach, and not, when I came to die, dis-
cover that I had not lived. I did not wish to live what was not
life, living is so dear; nor did I wish to practise resignation,
unless it was quite necessary. I wanted to live deep and suck
out all the marrow of life.2
Although Thoreau was not writing about the right to death
with dignity (RTDWD),3 his words eloquently capture much of
the philosophy animating this right, and their echo can be heard
in every reasoned request for assistance in hastening death,
including Diane's. In a 1991 letter to the New England Journal
of Medicine, Dr. Timothy Quill introduced the public to a woman
named Diane and described the events preceding her decision to
ingest a lethal dose of barbiturates.4 Diane had a type of leuke-
mia that only one in every four patients survived.5 Moreover,
her chance at survival came with a price---toxic and debilitat-
1. FRIEDRICH NIETZScHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS 118 (Walter
Kaufmann ed., Walter Kaufnann & R.J. Hollingdale trans., Vintage Books ed. 1989)
(1967).
2. HENRY D. THOREAU, WALDEN AND OTHER WRITINGS 81-82 (William Howarth
ed., 1981) (emphasis added).
3. The RTDWD is the right of a competent person to control the circumstances
surrounding her own death. This right entitles a person to assistance in the commis-
sion of suicide and encompasses a right to euthanasia in some situations. Because
the exercise of the right to forego or discontinue medical treatment-the right to die
(RTD)-involves physician assistance in many cases, see infr'a notes 286-91 and ac-
companying text, and is premised on individual interests identical to those justifying
the RTDWD, see infra notes 324, 333-35 and accompanying text, it is subsumed
within the RTDVvD.
This Note will assume that any assistance in dying vill be provided by a physi-
cian because the government has an interest in ensuring that those exercising the
RTDWD are competent to do so. See infra notes 378-89 and accompanying text.
4. Timothy E. Quill, Death and Dignity: A Case of Individualized Decision Mak-
ing, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 691 (1991).
5. Id. at 692.
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ing treatments that would probably confine her to a painful
death in a hospital.6 Diane declined treatment because she
wanted to live the remainder of her life according to her own
conscience, in a dignified manner, and not as a prisoner of
medical technology.'
Diane's efforts to live deliberately were frustrated, however,
because her decision to forego treatment could not eliminate the
risk of a progressively debilitating, undignified, and painful
death. She could only ensure that her death would occur outside
a hospital.' In short, "her fear of a lingering death [was]
interfer[ing] with [her ability to] get [] the most out of the time
she had left."
Certain that Diane was not despondent and that her decision
was well-reasoned, Dr. Quill, upon Diane's request, prescribed a
lethal dose of barbiturates to be taken when she decided that
she could no longer live "fully."'" Secured and comforted by the
knowledge that she could control her own death, Diane was able
to spend the last months of her life "in the woods.""
A striking aspect of Diane's story is the relationship it posits
between life and death. Dr. Quill's account makes it clear that
Diane's ability to control the events surrounding her own death
enabled her to pursue her conception of a meaningful life. This
is an intuitively powerful argument for a RTDWD, and, when
considered with the other individual interests implicated by
Diane's decision, 2 it underlies a compelling constitutional argu-
ment as well.
Despite the substantial interests underlying the RTDWD, the
law and the medical profession have been slow to adjust to the
rights and needs of individuals," as well as the realities of the
6. Id.
7. Id.




12. Diane's story indicates that several individual interests underlie the RTDWD:
self-determination, which encompasses the related rights to life, bodily integrity, and
freedom of conscience; personal dignity; and the mitigation of suffering. Id. at 692-
93.
13. See GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
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dying process.14 More disturbing, however, is that both the law
and the medical community refuse to recognize explicitly and
fully the panoply of interests implicated by decisions involving
death and the level of constitutional protection those interests
have received.
The American Medical Association (AMA), for example, sug-
gests that a patient's right to limited control over the circum-
stances surrounding her own death is justified by three inter-
ests: bodily integrity, as developed through the tort of battery
and the doctrine of informed consent; personal dignity; and the
mitigation of suffering.' As a result, the AMA confines a pa-
tient to a choice between refusing or discontinuing treatment
and submitting to increasing doses of pain-relieving drugs while
her doctor endeavors to maintain her dignity. 6 These guide-
329-50 (1957).
14. See Yeates Conwell & Eric D. Caine, Rational Suicide and the Right To Die:
Reality and Myth, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1100, 1101 (1991) (noting the lack of
attention paid to the suicide rate among the elderly, which is the highest in the
United States); Timothy E. Quill et al., Care of the Hopelessly Ill: Proposed Clinical
Criteria for Physician-Assisted Suicide, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1380, 1381 (1992)
(stating that, even with criminal sanctions in force, 6,000 deaths a day may be
planned, many through the use of pain-relieving drugs that hasten death-the dou-
ble-effect techmique); Mark A. Sager et al., Changes in the Location of Death After
Passage of Medicare's Prospective Payment System, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 433, 435
(1989) (finding that approximately 83% of those over age 65 die in a hospital or
nursing home); Sidney H. Wanzer et al., The Physician's Responsibility Toward Hope-
lessly Ill Patients, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 844, 845-46 (1989) (noting that hospice
and comfort care need to be improved and better insured).
15. See American Medical Association Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs,
Withholding or Withdrawing Life Prolonging Medical Treatment, in CODE OF MEDI-
CAL ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS § 2.20 (1994).
16. See id.; see also id. § 2.211 ("Physician assisted suicide is fundamentally
incompatible with the physician's role as healer . . . ." ). Although a person must
decide for herself if her dignity and bodily integrity will be preserved by confine-
ment in a hospital room and a life of increasing sedation, her decision will be
shaped by a consideration of her alternatives, which include starvation and suffoca-
tion (if her treatment requires a respirator). As Diaie's case illustrates, however,
this choice (without the possibility of additional assistance in the dying process)
creates a "catch-22" dilemma. See supra notes 4-11 and accompanying text; see also
Geoffrey N. Fieger, The Persecution and Prosecution of Dr. Death and His Mercy
Machine, 20 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 659, 670 (1994) (discussing the irony of a societal
shift toward more humane methods, such as lethal injection, of killing convicted
criminals while those who desire a dignified and controlled death are still forced to
undergo the tortuous processes of starvation or suffocation).
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lines ignore the other important interests underlying an
individual's right to control his death, such as self-determination
and (a more sophisticated understanding of) bodily integrity, and
promote a conception of physical, rather than spiritual and emo-
tional, suffering that justifies continuous medical treatment.
Although each interest underlying the RTDWD has received
legal protection, the statutory protection afforded these interests
under the aegis of the right to die (RTD) is very limited in scope
because existing RTD legislation arbitrarily restricts their reach.
In addition, physician-assisted suicide (PAS) is prohibited in
many states,17 and physician-committed euthanasia (PCE) is
prohibited in all states. 8 Furthermore, many courts have un-
dervalued the individual interests underlying the RTDWD,
thereby preventing a proper balancing of individual and state
interests. 9 Paralleling the AMA position, the legal status of the
RTDWD also reflects an incomplete understanding of the rela-
tionship between the process of dying and the individual inter-
ests implicated by this process-individual autonomy, personal
dignity, and the mitigation of suffering.
This Note will argue that many of the restrictions placed on
an individual's ability to control the circumstances surrounding
her own death are constitutionally impermissible. The next
section will survey recent developments in the law and the med-
ical profession involving the RTDWD and identify the significant
legal and philosophical issues that they introduce. These issues
will be addressed throughout the remainder of the Note. In the
third section, this Note will examine the Supreme Court's sub-
stantive due process jurisprudence and argue that Justice
Harlan's substantive due process theory is the proper analytical
framework for addressing unenumerated liberty claims. Justice
Harlan's theory will be employed to derive a constitutional
RTDWD in the fourth section. The fifth section of this Note will
evaluate the constitutionality of laws impacting this right. The
final section will review the preceding sections and offer some
17. See infra note 338 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 336 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.), reh'g
en banc granted, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995).
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concluding thoughts on the emerging RTDWD.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE RIGHT To DIE WITH
DIGNITY
Beginning with the Supreme Court's decision in Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health,' recent developments
regarding the constitutional status of the RTDWD have both
challenged and endorsed the status quo and its supporting ratio-
nales. Across the country, a number of doctors have abandoned
the AMA position and advocated legalizing certain forms of
assisted suicide. In Washington, a federal district court articu-
lated a constitutional right to PAS, only to be reversed by the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In Oregon, voters ap-
proved a limited statutory right to PAS, the enactment of which
was immediately enjoined by a federal district court. Like the
Ninth Circuit, courts in Michigan and New York have also re-
jected arguments for a constitutional right to PAS. This section
will explore these developments and illustrate the issues con-
fronting an advocate for a constitutionally protected RTDWD.
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health21
Decided in 1990, Cruzan represents the Supreme Court's only
decision involving the RTD.' In Cruzan, the Court was con-
fronted with a constitutional challenge, brought by the guard-
ians of a patient in a persistent vegetative state, to Missouri's
requirement that there must be clear and convincing evidence of
a previously competent' person's desire to have life-sustaining
treatment withheld or discontinued before such a step can be
taken.24 Read narrowly, Cruzan indicates that the Constitution
does not prevent Missouri from adopting this evidentiary
20. 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (plurality opinion).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 277.
23. A previously competent person is a person who at one time was competent,
see infr-a note 379 and accompanying text, but has been rendered incompetent as a
result of some event, such as the advent of a mental illness or a persistent vegeta-
tive state.
24. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 268-69.
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standard.' When read carefully, and in light of Planned Par-
enthood v. Casey,26 however, the various opinions in Cruzan are
of much greater constitutional significance.
Justices Rehnquist, White, and Kennedy
In Cruzan, three Justices assumed that a competent person
has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing med-
ical treatment,27 and balanced that interest against a state's
unqualified interest in preserving lifeY This balance favored
25. Id. at 284.
26. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
27. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279. The Justices derived this unenumerated and as-
sumed liberty interest by focusing on the common-law doctrine of informed consent
and its origins in the tort of battery. Id. at 269-79. By relying on the common law,
these Justices were able to avoid any consideration of: the individual interests un-
derlying the RTD; the constitutional precedent protecting these interests, such as
decisions interpreting the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments; and
the existence of state legislation demonstrating a commitment to these interests.
Consequently, these Justices were able to maintain a narrow definition of the as-
sumed constitutional right, thus placing previously competent individuals outside the
scope of its protection. The common-law tradition, however, prevented these Justices
from further narrowing the scope of the assumed right by incorporating a proximity
to death limitation on its exercise because a battery is not dependent upon the
victim's proximity to death.
28. Id. at 279-82. The plurality's balancing, however, resembled rational basis
review, see, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (finding a ratio-
nal relation to a legitimate state objective), rather than a careful weighing of indi-
vidual liberty and State interests. The Justices placed no weight on Nancy Cruzan's
side of the balance because she was incompetent. Had she been competent, she
would have been entitled to the weight of an assumed liberty interest. Cruzan, 497
U.S. at 279. The Court thus failed to articulate a constitutional right affected by the
Missouri statute, a clear indication of extremely deferential review.
This view of the balance as a disguised form of rational basis review is rein-
forced by the plurality's analysis of the relevant State interests. The plurality recog-
nized that the government has an unqualified interest, expressed in laws banning
homicide and assisted suicide, in the protection and preservation of human life. Id.
at 280-82. In endorsing this State interest, however, the Court failed to consider
that the justifications for laws proscribing homicide and assisted suicide are differ-
ent, see infra notes 299-318 and accompanying text, and that some states do not ban
assisted suicide, see infra note 339 and accompanying text. Because the scales did
not contain any countervailing individual right, however, the plurality did not exam-
ine the burden that this State interest, as furthered by the clear and convincing evi-
dence requirement, placed on Nancy Cruzan. The plurality's relaxed scrutiny of the
relevant State interests and the burdens that they created is also characteristic of
rational basis review. Cf. Williamson, 348 U.S. at 483 (demonstrating the character-
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the State's interest in life, and, therefore, the plurality upheld
the clear and convincing evidence requirement."
Justice Scalia
Although he disagreed with both the plurality and Justice
O'Connor, Justice Scalia agreed that the clear and convincing
evidence requirement was constitutional because the State's
interest in life was more than unqualified. He argued that
"American law has always accorded the State the power to pre-
vent, by force if necessary, suicide-including suicide by refusing
to take appropriate measures necessary to preserve one's life."3
Despite the fact that suicide is no longer illegal in any state,3'
Justice Scalia posited that state governments retain the power
to allow suicide only upon a showing of clear and convincing
evidence.32 Justice Scalia bolstered his conclusion by making a
larger point about unenumerated constitutional rights:
To raise up a constitutional right here we would have to
create [it] out of nothing (for it exists neither in text nor
tradition) .... This Court need not, and has no authority to,
inject itself into every field of human activity where irratio-
nality and oppression may theoretically occur, and if it tries
to do so it will destroy itself.3
Thus, Justice Scalia believed that there was no constitutional
mechanism by which the Court could invalidate Missouri's evi-
dentiary requirement.
istics of rational basis review).
29. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 286-S7.
30. Id. at 293, 296-97 (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that starving oneself to
death is no different from putting a gun to one's temple because the cause of death
in both cases is the conscious decision to put an end to one's own existence).
31. Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78, 84 (S.).N.Y. 1994).
32. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 295 (Scalia, J., concurring). This retained power, howev-
er, would also allow a state to use an even higher evidentiary standard or to pro-
hibit the exercise of the RTD entirely. Id. at 293 (Scalia, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 300-01 (Scalia, J., concurring).
1996] 833
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Justice O'Connor
Differing with both the plurality and Justice Scalia, Justice
O'Connor concluded that, because "the provision of nutrition and
hydration implicate[d]" ' concerns identical to those in the
Court's substantive due process35 and Fourth Amendment deci-
sions 6 protecting physical freedom, self-determination, and dig-
nity, "the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause must
protect, if it protects anything, an individual's deeply personal
decision to reject medical treatment, including the artificial
delivery of food and water."3' Justice O'Connor, therefore, ex-
plicitly articulated a constitutionally protected RTD but found
that the clear and convincing evidence requirement was an ap-
propriate expression of the State's interest in protecting life."5
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun
Differing sharply from the opinions of the plurality and Jus-
tice Scalia, and expanding on the views of Justice O'Connor,
Justice Brennan categorized the right to refuse medical treat-
ment as fundamental,39 rather than as a liberty interest. As an
infringement on a fundamental right, the clear and convincing
evidence standard was therefore unconstitutional."
34. Id. at 288 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
35. Id. at 287 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165, 172 (1952); Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
36. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759
(1985); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966)).
37. Id. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor's explicit articulation
of a constitutionally protected RTD did not include a proximity to death limitation
on its exercise. Furthermore, her definition of the RTD did not distinguish between
presently and previously competent individuals, and her suggestion that a state may
be constitutionally required to honor the decisions of an incompetent person's surro-
gate decisionmaker indicates that she would not draw suchi a distinction. Id. at 289-
90 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 292 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (failing to articulate the methodology for
arriving at this conclusion).
39. Id. at 304-05 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argued that, because
the right to refuse medical treatment was protected by a longstanding common-law
doctrine based on important individual interests, it was a fundamental right even
within the stringent Bowers test. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting); see infra notes 180-82
and accompanying text (discussing the Bowers test).
40. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 312-13 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that a "[s]tate
834
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Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens also concluded that Nancy Cruzan had a fun-
damental right to refuse medical treatment.41 He went beyond
Justice Brennan's view of a state's interest in life, however, and
argued that a state's general interest in preserving life did not
include a "life" such as Nancy Cruzan's. The State's general
interest, therefore, could not conflict with Nancy Cruzan's funda-
mental RTD.
42
has no legitimate general interest in someone's life, completely abstracted from the
interest of the person living that life, that could outweigh the person's choice to
avoid medical treatment"). Unlike the plurality, Justice Brennan also recognized that
Nancy Cruzan did not lose her fimdamental right simply by becoming incompetent.
Id. at 308 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Moreover, Justice Brennan refused to limit the
scope of the RTD based on an individual's proximity to death or the type of
treatment involved because the RTD cannot be "qualified in its application by either
the nature or purpose of the treatment, or the gravity of the consequences of acced-
ing to or foregoing it.'" Id. at 306 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Tune v. Walter
Reed Army Medical Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452, 1455 (D.D.C. 1985)); see also Bouvia
v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986) (upholding the right of a quadriplegic
woman with cerebral palsy to have her feeding tube removed); In re Farrell, 529
A.2d 404, 413 (N.J. 1987) (failing to include a proximity to death requirement in its
definition of the RTD); Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77 (N.Y. 1990) (allowing a
patient to refuse a life-saving blood transfusion even though she was not terminally
ill). This position accords with the common-law history underlying the RTD and the
development of that right in state courts. The common-law right to refuse medical
treatment is based on the application of the tort of battery to the medical profes-
sion. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269. For example, if a doctor fails to obtain a patient's
informed consent before treatment, then that doctor is liable for a battery. Id. The
corollary of this consent requirement is the patient's right to refuse consent, id. at
270, regardless of his underlying medical condition, unless that condition poses a
threat of harm to others. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
41. Justice Stevens reasoned that an individual has a fundamental right to make
decisions about matters that constitute the realm of private life, Cruzan, 497 U.S. at
341 (Stevens, J., dissenting), and that an individuars bodily integrity is an aspect of
private life, id. at 342 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Choices about death that implicate
bodily integrity are thus protected as fundamental rights. Id. at 342-43 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
42. Id. at 350 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated:
Missouri has arrogated to itself the power to define life, and only be-
cause the Court permits this usurpation, are Nancy Cruzan's life and
liberty put into disquieting conflict. If Nancy Crazan's life were defined
by reference to her own interests . . . her constitutionally protected inter-
est in freedom from unwanted [medical] treatment would not come into
conflict with her constitutionally protected interest in life.
Id. at 351 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens thus also rejected a definition of
the RTD that included proximity to death and presently competent restrictions on its
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Dr. Quill and the Evolving Views of the Medical Profession
Since confessing his role in Diane's death, Dr. Quill has be-
come a leading advocate for improvements in comfort and hos-
pice care, as well as the legalization of PAS. Joined by two other
physicians, Dr. Quill has proposed the legalization of PAS for
competent individuals with incurable conditions associated with
extreme suffering.43 Interestingly, Dr. Quill's proposal rejected
both proximity to death requirements44 and the possibility of
PCE.45
Compassion in Dying v. Washington"
In Compassion in Dying, a Washington statute barring all
forms of assisted suicide was invalidated as an "undue burden
on the exercise of a protected.., liberty interest by terminally
ill, mentally competent adults acting knowingly and voluntari-
ly,.., who wish to commit physician-assisted suicide." 7 The
district court opinion, written by Chief Judge Rothstein, was the
first to articulate explicitly a constitutional foundation for an
individual's right to receive medical assistance, other than the
withdrawing of treatment, in the commission of suicide.4' The
Compassion in Dying decision is therefore an important step
toward a constitutional RTDWD.49
exercise.
43. Quill et al., supra note 14, at 1380. Polls consistently demonstrate that
many members of the medical community are in favor of PAS. See, e.g., David
Brown, Medical Community Still Divided on Oregon's Assisted Suicide Act, WASH.
POST, Nov. 13, 1994, at A20 (stating that 53% of Washington doctors support a right
to PAS).
44. Quill et al., supra note 14, at 1381 (finding such requirements arbitrary
when applied to individuals suffering from diseases like multiple sclerosis).
45. Id. (justifying this limitation on the rights of competent and incurably ill
patients who cannot swallow or move on the grounds that PCE poses a greater risk
of involuntary death than PAS).
46. 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1467 (W.D. Wash. 1994), rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.),
reh'g en banc granted, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. The decision was instrumental in shaping the constitutional challenges to
laws banning assisted suicide in New York and Miclhigan. See, e.g., Quill v. Koppel,
870 F. Supp. 78, 84-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 727
(Mich. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1795, and cert. denied sub nom. Hobbins v.
836 [V7ol. 37:827
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In striking down the Washington statute, the district court
relied heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in Planned Par-
enthood v. Casey.0 The court viewed the reasoning in Casey as
incorporating a constitutional right to PAS because, "like the
[constitutionally protected] abortion decision, the decision of a
terminally ill person to end his or her life 'involves the most
intimate and personal choices a person can make in a lifetime'
and constitutes a 'choice central to personal dignity and autono-
my."'' The court also reasoned that, because the suffering of a
terminally ill patient cannot be deemed any less intimate than
that of a pregnant woman, its mitigation is also constitutionally
protected. 2 Furthermore, because the federal court was obligat-
ed to prevent the State from resolving profound spiritual and
moral questions in a categorical fashion,53 it struck down the
Washington law proscribing all forms of assisted suicide, just as
the Court in Casey indicated that it would strike down statutes
proscribing all abortions.
Also relying on Casey when protecting the right to PAS, the
district court evaluated the effects of the statute under the un-
due burden test.54 In applying the undue burden test, the court
concluded that the State's interests in preventing suicide were
incapable of justifying the absolute prohibition on assisted sui-
cide.5 The statute therefore constituted an undue burden on
Kelly, 115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995).
50. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
51. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1459-60 (citing Casey, 112 S. Ct. at
2807). The court supported its conclusion by relying on Cruzan and the proposition
that, "[flrom a constitutional perspective, the court does not believe that a distinction
can be drawn between refusing life-sustaining medical treatment [for the purpose of
hastening death] and physician-assisted suicide by an uncoerced, mentally competent,
terminally ill adult." Id. at 1461.
52. Id. at 1459-60.
53. Id. at 1460 (citing Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2806).
54. Id. at 1465 (citing Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820).
55. The State asserted two interests furthered by the statute: preventing suicide
and preventing undue influence and abuse. Id. at 1464-65. The court characterized
the State's interest in preventing suicide as narrowly focused on deterring suicide by
children and by adults with significant remaining natural life spans. Id. at 1464.
This interest was unaffected by the actions of a competent and terminally ill adult.
Id. Borrowing from Cruzan, the opinion noted that the risks associated with PAS
are also present when a person elects to forego treatment, yet the right to refuse
treatment is not discounted on this basis. Id. at 1467.
1996]
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the right of a competent and terminally ill person to PAS.56
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, reversed
the Washington District Court.57 Confining the language of
Casey to the abortion context, 58 the court of appeals suggested
that the Cruzan decision did not support a right to PAS because
the plurality recognized a state's unqualified interest in preserv-
ing life-an interest exemplified by laws proscribing assisted
suicide.59 In addition, Judges Noonan and O'Scannlain found no
support for the right to PAS in other Supreme Court precedent
or in our national traditions.60 The State's interests in prevent-
ing coercion and abuse were therefore sufficient to justify the
ban on assisted suicide.61
Oregon's Measure 16
Like the decisions in Cruzan and Compassion in Dying, th
enactment of Measure 16 was a legal first. Passed on November
8, 1994, the Oregon Death with Dignity Act is the only voter-
initiated legislation to create a right to PAS.62 Although the law
is very limited in its scope and very rigid in its regulation of the
practice of assisted suicide, it is also an important step toward a
RTDWD.
63
The law has several salient features. First, the right to PAS is
possessed only by Oregon residents with less than six months to
live.64 Second, a doctor's obligations 65 before writing a pre-
56. Id. at 1465.
57. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.), reh'g en banc
granted, 62 F.3d 297 (9th Cir. 1995).
58. Id. at 590.
59. Id. at 591 (citing Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280
(1990) (plurality opinion)).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 592-93. The dissent, however, argued that the Casey decision, when
combined with the lack of a constitutionally significant distinction between the RTD
and PAS, required the recognition of a constitutional right to PAS. Id. at 595-96
(Wright, J., dissenting).
62. See Brown, supra note 43.
63. It remains to be seen, however, whether the law will take effect. Implemen-
tation of Measure 16 has been temporarily enjoined pending the resolution of consti-
tutional challenges to its provisions by doctors and their terminally ill patients, as
well as residential care providers. See Lee v. Oregon, 869 F. Supp. 1491 (D. Or.
1994).
64. MEASURE 16, THE OREGON DEATH WITH DIGNITY AcT § 2.01, reprinted in
838 [Vol. 37:827
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scription requested by a patient include explaining the patient's
prognosis6 and discussing alternatives to suicide." Third, a
second physician must examine the patient," verify the diag-
nosis," and attest that the person is capable and acting vol-
untarily." If a patient appears to be suffering from a psy-
chiatric illness, he must be referred for counseling,7' and no
prescription can be written until he has overcome any diag-
nosed mental illness.72 Finally, the patient must obtain and
take the drug73 because the law specifically proscribes any
form of euthanasia.74
People v. Kevorkian 75
Rejecting the reasoning in Compassion in Dying, the Michigan
Supreme Court in Kevorkian rebuked the constitutional chal-
lenges of Dr. Kevorkian and the Michigan ACLU and denied
constitutional protection to those seeking assistance in the com-
mission of suicide and those willing to provide it.7" Foreshadow-
ing the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit and a federal district
court in New York, the majority refused to apply the reasoning
of Casey to the RTDWD.77 Moreover, the court also rejected the
substantive due process inquiry utilized in Casey in favor of the
framework articulated in Bowers v. Hardwick.7" Applying the
Kathy T. Graham, Last Rights: Oregon's New Death with Dignity Act, 31
WILLAMETTE L. REv. 601 (1995).
65. Physicians are not required to assist in an individual's suicide. Id. § 4.01.
66. Id. § 3.01(2)(b).
67. Id. § 3.01(2)(e).
68. Id. § 3.02.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. § 3.03.
72. See id.
73. See id. § 4.01(1).
74. Id. § 3.14.
75. 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1795, and cert. denied
sub nona. Hobbins v. Kelly, 115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995).
76. Id. at 727-28.
77. Id. at 730. The court also distinguished Cruzan by stating that a constitu-
tionally significant difference exists between withholding or withdrawing medical
treatment and actively hastening death. Id. at 728-29.
78. See id. at 730.
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Bowers methodology, the court concluded that there was no
constitutional right to assisted suicide because there was no
historical legal tradition protecting suicide.79 In bolstering its
conclusion, the majority argued that, even under a substantive
due process theory derived from Justice Harlan's opinion in Poe
v. Ullman,"° on which the Casey joint opinion relied,"1 it would
have reached the same conclusion because the right to assisted
suicide is a "radical departure from historical precepts." 2
Quill v. Koppel 83
For reasons very similar to those enunciated by the Michigan
Supreme Court in Kevorkian, a federal district court in New
York rejected a constitutional challenge to New York's ban on
assisted suicide. 4 Like the Michigan Supreme Court and the
Ninth Circuit, the Quill opinion refused to construe the Supreme
Court's holdings in Casey and Cruzan as broad enough to protect
the right to PAS.8 5 Similarly, the court also refused to apply
the substantive due process framework adopted by the joint
opinion in Casey and, instead, relied on the Court's decision in
Bowers."5
79. Id. at 730-33.
80. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
81. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2805, 2806, 2811 (1992).
82. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d at 730. The dissenting opinions, however, argued that
the reasoning underlying the Casey decision indicated a constitutionally protected
right to PAS in some cases. See. e.g., id. at 750-51 (Levin, J. concurring in part and
dissenting in part); id. at 752-53, 759 (Mallett, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Furthermore, one dissenter argued that the majority had misapplied Justice
Harlan's theory of substantive due process. See id. at 756-57 (Mallett, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
83. 870 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
84. Id. at 84-85.
85. Id. at 83 (interpreting Casey as limited to decisions involving abortion, pro-
creation, and childrearing, while suggesting that Cruzan did not articulate a consti-
tutional RTD and that, if it had, there would be a constitutionally significant differ-
ence between the RTD and PAS).
86. Id. at 83-84.
840 [Vol. 37:827
RIGHT TO DIE WITH DIGNITY
The Legal and Jurisprudential Implications of These Recent
Developments
As the recent developments involving the right to PAS indi-
cate, the RTDWD must be constitutionally protected. Although
the motives of the voters in Oregon and of the doctors who have
proposed legalizing PAS are laudable, statutory protection for an
important liberty is tenuous; what the present majority confers,
a later majority can rescind 7 until the constitutional '"limits
[on the ability of a state to] experiment[] at the expense of the
dignity and personality' of the individual"' are defined.
An advocate of the RTDWD must therefore identify the appro-
priate method for judicial derivation and protection of
unenumerated rights because the adoption of a particular sub-
stantive due process theory can determine the outcome of a
constitutional challenge.8 9 Equally important is an advocate's
utilization of the strong public support for various conceptions of
a RTDWD ° within that theory because the development of this
87. This is the paradox of a republican form of government designed to protect
individual liberty, for
[a]s long as the reason of man continues (to be] fallible, and he is at
liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the
connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and
his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the for-
mer will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves.
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Developments in the RTDWD debate have followed Madison's prediction. In
California and Washington, for example, initiatives to legalize PAS initially enjoyed
widespread public support but failed after opposition groups successfully utilized
emotionally and religiously charged advertising. See Mary M. Penrose, Assisted Sui-
cide: A Tough Pill To Swallow, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 689, 708-11 (1993).
88. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 555 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 546 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
89. Compare, e.g., People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994) (employing
the Bowers test and denying constitutional recognition of a right to PAS), cert. de-
nied, 115 S. Ct. 1795, and cert. denied sub nona. Hobbins v. Kelly, 115 S. Ct. 1795
(1995) with Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash.
1994) (utilizing the Casey methodology and the implications of the Cruzan decision
to recognize a constitutional right to PAS), rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.), reh'g en
banc granted, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995).
90. See DEREK HUMPHRY, LAWFUL EXIT: THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM FOR HELP IN
DYING 25 (1993) (70% of the worldwide population supports "physician-aided dying");
Brown, supra note 43; Nancy Gibbs, Love and Let Die, TIME, Mar. 19, 1990, at 62,
64 (57% of the respondents to a Time/CNN poll favored assisted suicide); Dick Lehr,
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right should not be the type of activism frowned upon by a Court
reluctant to engage in any form of substantive due process anal-
ysis,91 but should instead be seen as the rational expansion of a
rooted and developing societal tradition shaped by the RTD, as
well as by important interests currently protected by statutes,
the common law, and the Constitution.
In deriving the RTDWD, the recent developments involving
PAS indicate that its contours must be defined,92 and the im-
port of the Court's decisions in Casey93 and Cruzan94 dis-
cerned. Moreover, in evaluating infringements on the RTDWD,
courts must develop an appropriate level of judicial scrutiny95
and must also articulate the government's interests in protecting
life and ensuring competency.96 The next section argues for a
substantive due process framework in which this derivation can
take place.
Death and the Doctor's Hand, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 26, 1993, at 1 (90% of those
polled favored assisted suicide); see also infra notes 319-35 and accompanying text
(discussing legislation involving the RTD).
91. See, e.g., infra note 177.
92. As the various positions presented have shown, this process will involve the
evaluation of proximity to death and present competency requirements, see supra
notes 22-27, 40, 47, 64 and accompanying text, as well as the evolution of the RTD
and its relationship to PAS, see supra notes 30, 43, 55, 59, 85 and accompanying
text, and PCE, see supra notes 45, 74 and accompanying text.
93. Drawing on the different views expressed in the opinions discussing PAS,
this inquiry will focus on the relevance of Justice Harlan's substantive due process
theory, see supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text, and the reasoning in Casey,
see supra notes 50, 58, 77, 85-86 and accompanying text.
94. Because Cruzan is the only Supreme Court decision involving the RTDWD,
this examination will analyze the positions taken in Cruzan and their implications,
see supra notes 27-42 and accompanying text, and also will review the similarities
between the conduct protected by the RTD and the RT'DWD, see supra notes 30, 43,
55, 59, 85 and accompanying text.
95. Compare Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279-82
(1990) (utilizing a balancing test) with Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F.
Supp. 1454, 1463-64 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (adopting the undue burden standard), rev'd,
49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.), reh'g en banc granted, 69 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995) and Peo-
ple v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 730 (Mich. 1994) (employing rational basis re-
view), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1795, and cert. denied sub nor. Hobbins v. Kelly, 115
S. Ct. 1795 (1995).
96. Broadening the focus of the courts that have confronted this issue, this pro-
ject will involve an evaluation of an individual's right to life and the history of laws
proscribing suicide. See supra note 28.
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DERIVING UNENUMERATED RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT'S
PUZZLING SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS JURISPRUDENCE
As demonstrated by Roe v. Wade,97 the Supreme Court has
recognized that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment has a substantive, as well as a procedural, compo-
nent.9" Nevertheless, the Court's substantive due process juris-
prudence has varied dramatically since Roe, as the members of
the "least dangerous branch"99 have struggled to define an ana-
lytical framework for the resolution of constitutional challenges
involving individual liberties not within the scope of specific
constitutional provisions. The end, however, has not justified the
means. Twenty-two years of acrimonious debate within the
Court have yielded several competing, yet coexisting, approaches
to, rather than a consensus on, matters of Due Process Clause
interpretation.
This section will trace the development of the Supreme
Court's substantive due process jurisprudence from its resurrec-
tion in Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman'
and argue that, based on precedent and constitutional values,
the interpretive framework developed by Justice Harlan should
govern unenumerated rights claims. The first two prongs of this
argument suggest that, because Justice Harlan's views have
implicitly shaped many of the Court's decisions, including Roe v.
Wade,'0 and explicitly molded others, including Moore v. City
of East Cleveland, °2 his substantive due process theory should
remain the lens through which the Court views liberty claims.
The third prong of the argument posits that several of the
Court's decisions have misconstrued the constitutional values
enmeshed in Justice Harlan's theory and that, as a result, many
of the difficulties associated with substantive due process, in-
97. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
98. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804 (1992).
99. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962). Of course,
this characterization depends on the definition of "danger," for a weak Court may
endanger constitutional liberties by failing to confront legislative and executive
power.
100. 367 U.S. 497, 539-55 (1961).
101. 410 U.S. 113.
102. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
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cluding its impact on the Court's constitutional legitimacy, are
consequences of the improper application of this theory."3 The
fourth, and most important, prong of this argument contends
that Justice Harlan's substantive due process theory, unlike
others utilized by the Court, is entirely consistent with the con-
stitutional role of the Supreme Court within a government of
separated, yet balanced, powers.
The Phoenix Rises from Its Ashes: Justice Harlan's Dissent in
Poe v. Ullman
After the Lochner era,0 4 the specter of substantive due pro-
cess haunted even those Justices dedicated to an expansive
articulation of the substantive freedoms protected by the Consti-
tution.0 4 Despite its constitutional legacy, the doctrine of sub-
stantive due process reappeared briefly in Rochin v. Califor-
nia, '5 only to be banished again by the Warren Court and the
ascendance of the Equal Protection Clause.0 6 Dissatisfied with
the constitutional landscape unfolding before him, Justice
Harlan announced that the Due Process Clause could
"stand[ ... on its own bottom"' and articulated a theory of
substantive due process that was sensitive to individual liberty,
state interests, and the role of the federal courts in our constitu-
tional system.
103. But cf. David M. Smolin, The Jurisprudence of Privacy in a Splintered Su-
preme Court, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 975, 1049-51 (1992) (arguing that the trauma result-
ing from the Court's errors in applying substantive due process overshadows the
benefits realized from application of the doctrine).
104. The Lochner era was a period in the early twentieth century when the Su-
preme Court struck down New Deal legislation and other laws on the grounds that
those laws violated substantive due process. The period was typified by the Court's
landmark opinion in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
104. See infra note 156 (discussing Justice Douglas's opinion in Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
105. 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (holding that the forcible pumping of a person's stomach
violated the Due Process Clause).
106. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658-59 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(noting "unwise" extensions of suspect classifications under the Equal Protection
Clause and arguing that when "a classification is based upon the exercise of rights
guaranteed against state infringement by the Federal Constitution," substantive due
process renders equal protection analysis unnecessary).
108. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Deriving Unenumerated Liberty Rights
Justice Harlan's substantive due process jurisprudence was
premised on the Court's decision in McCulloch v. Maryland 9
and his belief that the Constitution was "built upon postulates of
respect for the liberty of the individual.""' Applying these
views to the problem of defining the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause, Justice Harlan found the incorporation doctrine
to be inconsistent with the tenor of our Constitution"' because
the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause were not "iso-
lated" instances of protected conduct,"' but were instead a
broad and continuous range, or "rational continuum,""' of hu-
man activities."' Substantive due process analysis therefore
required a determination of whether an asserted liberty right
could be placed on this rational continuum.
The contours of the rational continuum are illuminated by our
living constitutional tradition,"5 which consists of the purposes
of the Constitution as they are rationally perceived and devel-
oped." '6 An inquiry into the liberties protected by the Due Pro-
cess Clause must therefore consider relevant constitutional pre-
cedent. 7 and society's evolving conception, as expressed in the
109. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (stating that the nature of the Constitu-
tion "requires, that only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects
designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those objects, be deduced from
the nature of the objects themselves").
110. Poe v. Uliman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
111. See id. at 541-42 (Harlan, J:, dissenting). Expanding on his two interpretive
premises, Justice Harlan believed that the Due Process Clause was "an independent
guaranty of liberty . . . more general and inclusive than the specific prohibitions" on
government action contained in the first eight constitutional amendments. Id. at 542
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
113. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 543-44 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the purposes behind
the first eight amendments are evidence of a "rational continuum" of protected con-
duct that comprises the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause); see Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 176 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
115. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 176-77 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Poe, 367 U.S. at
543-44 (Harlan, J., dissenting); John M. Harlan, Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping
the Judicial Function in Balance, 49 A.BA. J. 943, 944 (1963).
116. See Poe, 367 U.S. at 544 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Harlan, supra note 115, at
943-44.
117. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 176 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Poe, 367 U.S. at 544
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development of our nation's practices and laws, of the proper
balance between individual liberty and state authority.
1 18
Whether a liberty claim can take its place on the rational con-
tinuum is determined by its relationship to the living constitu-
tional tradition.
No formula exists, however, for deciding what type of relation-
ship must exist before constitutional protection will be afforded
to an aspect of liberty.1 9 Instead, four principles guide this de-
termination. First, constitutional interpretation requires judges
to exercise rational and reasoned judgment. 2 ° Second, when
confronted with an unenumerated rights claim, a judge must
exercise restraint. 1 ' Third, a decision granting constitutional
protection to a liberty right must build on the shared aspects,
not the incongruent elements, of the living constitutional tradi-
tion,122 recognizing that, although its three components will
rarely be in complete harmony, a constitutional right may still
exist. Fourth, a protected liberty right should not merely dupli-
cate a historical practice but should take 'its place in relation to






118. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 176-77 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Griswold v. Connect-
icut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring); Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan,
J., dissenting); Harlan, supra note 115, at 943-44.
119. Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Although Justice Harlan sug-
gested in 1961 that homosexuality, abortion, suicide, and euthanasia were not likely
to receive constitutional protection (at that time), see id. at 547 (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing), his statement does not prohibit utilizing his theory to derive constitutional
protection for one of these activities because, as Justice Harlan noted, adherence to
his theory "will not . ..obviate all constitutional differences of opinion among judg-
es, nor should it." Griswold, 381 U.S. at 501 (Harlan, J., concurring). More impor-
tantly, given Justice Harlan's views on the evolutionary nature of the Due Process
Clause, the fact that a right was not protected in 1961 cannot prevent that right's
protection in the 1990s. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 176-77 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
120. Poe, 367 U.S at 542, 544-45 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Rochin v. Cali-
fornia, 342 U.S. 165, 170-71 (1952)).
121. Id. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see Griswold, 381 U.S. at 501 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
122. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 176 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Poe, 367 U.S. at 542
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that "[a] decision of this Court which radically de-
parts from [our living constitutional tradition] could not long survive, while a deci-
sion which builds on what has survived is likely to be sound").
123. Poe, 367 U.S. at 544 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting
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Determining If a Liberty Right Has Been Unconstitutionally
Infringed
Mirroring his dissatisfaction with formalistic substantive due
process analysis, Justice Harlan decried inflexible methods of
determining whether a right protected by the Due Process
Clause had been unconstitutionally infringed.'24 Relying on his
view of the Due Process Clause as a balance between individual
'liberty and the demands of organized society,""2  Justice
Harlan described the determination of whether a protected liber-
ty right had been impermissibly infringed as a balancing of the
impact of the government action on the exercise of that liberty
against the state interests advanced by the regulation and the
means chosen to effectuate those interests. 26
Justice Harlan's opinions in Poe and Shapiro indicate that
this balance was calibrated according to the degree of govern-
ment regulation implicated in each case. In Poe, for example,
Connecticut prohibited a constitutionally protected liberty.'27
Because a ban constituted the greatest possible infringement on
the exercise of a protected liberty, the balance was calibrated to
favor Connecticut only upon a showing that the ban was narrow-
ly tailored to further a compelling state interest.2 ' When con-
fronted, however, with a welfare residency requirement that
indirectly and insubstantially impacted on the right to trav-
el,'29 Justice Harlan concluded that the balance required the
State to show that the regulation was "clearly suited" to the fur-
therance of "legitimate" state interests.3 °
These decisions illustrate two important aspects of Justice
Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 147 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). Justice
Harlan's evolutionary view of tradition and the Due Process Clause accords with the
judicial role articulated in The Federalist. See infra notes 148-53 and accompanying
text.
124. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 661-62, 677 (1969) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500-01 (Harlan, J., concurring).
125. Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
126. See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 674, 676-77 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Poe, 367 U.S.
at 554 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
127. Poe, 367 U.S. at 548-49 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 543, 554 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
129. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 676 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
130. See id.
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Harlan's substantive due process theory. First, all government
regulations, regardless of their degree of infringement on a pro-
tected liberty right, are subjected to a meaningful balancing test
rather than formalistic scrutiny. 131 Second, the balance is cali-
brated flexibly: as the burden imposed on the protected right
becomes increasingly direct and substantial, the asserted state
interests must be stronger and better-tailored in order to justify
the regulation.'32
The implications of Justice Harlan's position appear when one
compares his dissenting opinion with the majority's holding in
Shapiro. In Shapiro, the majority struck down state laws condi-
tioning welfare eligibility on a period of in-state residency. 1
Employing strict scrutiny review based on the fundamental
rights strand of Equal Protection Clause analysis, the Court
found the laws to be unconstitutional infringements on the right
to travel."' Although Justice Harlan agreed that the residency
requirement impacted on the right to travel, he argued that in-
fringements on an unenumerated liberty were the province of
substantive due process rather than equal protection. 35 Em-
ploying substantive due process principles, Justice Harlan con-
131. See TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN: GREAT DISSENTER OF
THE WARREN COURT 313 (1992).
132. Poe and Shapiro dealt with opposite ends of the spectrum of potential gov-
ernment regulation. At one pole is a complete ban on an activity that is subjected to
strict scrutiny. See Poe, 367 U.S. at 548 (Harlan, J., dissenting). At the other pole is
an indirect and insubstantial effect on an activity that is justified when the regu-
lation is clearly suited to the furtherance of legitimate State interests. See Shapiro,
394 U.S. at 676-77 (Harlan, J., dissenting). It is logical to infer, then, that between
these poles lie several types of government regulations that fall on a continuum
from most burdensome to least burdensome, such as prohibitions, direct and substan-
tial burdens, indirect and substantial burdens, direct and insubstantial burdens, and
indirect and insubstantial burdens. As one moves along the continuum of burdens,
from those that are indirect and insubstantial to those that are prohibitions, the bal-
ance is calibrated to require a more carefully justified government regulation.
133. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 627.
134. Id. at 634, 638.
135. Id. at 659 (Harlan, J., dissenting). This difference was a critical distinction
because the fundamental rights strand of substantive due process analysis did not
exist in 1969. See infra note 167. Consequently, the Court might uphold a regulation
evaluated under a substantive due process balancing test despite its infringement on
an important liberty, whereas its evaluation under an equal protection test would
lead to its invalidation.
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cluded that several legitimate state interests 136 outweighed the
indirect and insubstantial burden on the right to travel. In eval-
uating the majority's approach, Justice Harlan foreshadowed the
attacks that would later be made on substantive due process
analysis. He wrote that "extend[ing] the 'compelling interest'
rule to all cases in which [fundamental] rights are affected [will]
go far toward making this Court a 'super-legislature""37 in a
way that a "judicial application of [substantive] 'due
process""3 will not because "[v]irtually every state statute af-
fects important rights."39 Implicit in this critique of the
Court's use of strict scrutiny was Justice Harlan's view that
categorical approaches to protecting individual liberty were
inconsistent with the constitutional doctrine of separated powers
and with the role of government structure in "establishing and
preserving American freedoms." 4 °
The Influence of Separation of Powers Principles on
Substantive Due Process
Substantive due process is an important element of our consti-
tutional system, for a charter designed to "secure ... private
rights against the danger of... a [majority] faction, and...
preserve the spirit and form of popular government"'' would
be poorly suited to the task if it protected only a finite number
136. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 676 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 661 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 677 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitu-
tional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 969-71 (1987) (stating that
the Cour's decisions in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (relying on Justice
Harlan's opinion in Poe), and Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), reveal an effort by
the Court, through balancing, to protect nontextual rights and keep the Court within
the bounds of the Constitution). But cf. The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Leading
Cases, 106 HARV. L. REV. 163, 218 (1992) (rejecting the use of balancing tests be-
cause they allow the federal courts to act as "superlegislatures").
139. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 661 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
140. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring);
see also Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 677 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
majority's decision ignored the constitutional division of power among the three
branches of the federal government).
141. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 87, at 80 (emphasis added). The consti-
tutional balance, therefore, is not struck between individual liberty and majoritarian
rule.
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of individual liberties. In a constitutional system structured to
protect liberty, the role of substantive due process must be
shaped by principles of federalism and within the context of
three separate and mutually checked governmental powers. As
noted in The Federalist:
[The] separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of
government.., is admitted on all hands to be essential to
the preservation of liberty ....
But the great security against a gradual concentration of
the several powers in the same department consists in giving
to ... each department the necessary constitutional means
and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.
[TIhe constant aim is to divide and arrange the several
offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the
other.. .42
Substantive due process, as an aspect of judicial review,' is
thus a check on legislative and executive power,144 and is part
of a constitutional structure designed to balance our commit-
ments to individual liberty and the principles of republican
government.
Our constitutional system, therefore, has an internal homeo-
stasis-a theoretical point where the balance between individual
liberty and legitimate government will be properly struck-that
is realized when the proper amount of power is distributed in
each of the three branches, as well as the states.'45 Although
142. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321-22 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
143. James Madison explicitly linked judicial review to the Bill of Rights. When
he introduced the Bill of Rights to the first Congress, Madison stated that "indepen-
dent tribunals of justice will consider themselves . . . guardians of those rights; they
will be an impenetrable bulwark against evely assumption of power in the legislative
[sic] or executive." GALES & SEATON, ANNALS OF CONGRESS (1834), reprinted in
BENNETT B. PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINH AMENDMENT 116 (1955) (emphasis
added). The first eight amendments, however, were only a partial enumeration of
constitutionally protected liberties and were supplemented by the Ninth Amendment.
See infra notes 223-27 and accompanying text. Thus, the scope of judicial review of
government actions implicating individual liberty was not entirely defined by the
first eight amendments.
144. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (noting that the courts act as a "bulwark" against "encroachments").
145. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 142, at 320-21 (arguing that liberty
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no bright line test defines the appropriate amount of power for
each constitutional actor, and no test could because power ebbs
and flows between the branches and between the federal govern-
ment and the states, the constitutional balance struck between
liberty and both the spirit and form of popular government is
threatened when power is allocated disproportionately among
these actors. The constitutional balance can tilt unjustifiably
toward unrestrained liberty or unfettered majority rule."6
The issue confronting federal courts adjudicating constitution-
al claims based on the Due Process Clause thus becomes how to
exercise the power of judicial review within this constitutional
balance. Echoing Alexander Hamilton, Justice Harlan exhorted
judges to use their judgment when engaging in this form of
judicial review."'
In The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton characterized the fed-
eral courts as "an intermediate body between the people and the
legislature"'' designed to maintain the constitutional balance
by preventing, through the use of judicial review, "dangerous
innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the
minor party in the community"'' that would eventually "give
[way] to better information, and more deliberate reflection."150
While exercising judicial review in furtherance of the constitu-
tional balance, however, the federal courts were not free to "sub-
stitute their own pleasure to the constitutional intentions of the
is protected in our constitutional system by "contriving the interior structure of the
government [so] that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be
the means of keeping each other in their proper places").
146. This problem plagued democracies throughout history because government
structures consistently failed to prevent democratic governments from fluctuating
wildly between tyranny and anarchy. THE FEDERALIST No. 9, at 71 (Alexander Ham-
ilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). The separation of powers, including principles of
federalism, when combined with a system of checks and balances, was designed to
maintain a balance between these two extremes. Id. at 72-73.
147. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 176 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing) (stating that substantive due process involves a "discriminating process of adju-
dication . . . [that] entails a 'gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion")
(quoting Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877)).
148. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
149. Id. at 469.
150. Id.
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legislature."151 They could not "exercise WILL instead of
JUDGMENT." 2 The constitutional balance between individual
liberty and the spirit and form of popular government therefore
requires the sensitivity of federal courts to their constitutional
role by exercising the power of judicial review in the service of
reasoned judgment.153
151. Id. at 468-69.
152. Id. at 469. Cf Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 502 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (arguing that restrained judgment will prevent the federal courts from
"roaming at large in the constitutional field"). Judicial will is thus the antithesis of
judgment. The characteristics of judgment are discretion, as well as discerning and
comparative reasoning, see BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PRO-
CESS 141 (1921); MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 633 (10th ed. 1993),
which are also the trademarks of meaningful constitutional balancing and the deriva-
tion of unenumerated constitutional rights. The absence of these characteristics from
the reasoning of a judicial opinion indicates an indiscriminate seizure or relinquish-
ment of judicial power and a violation of the constitutional balance of power.
153. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2806 (1992); Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 544-45 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan's invoca-
tion of the separation of powers doctrine in response to the majority's use of strict
scrutiny to invalidate incidental and insubstantial burdens on the right to travel in
Shapiro was an objection to the exercise of judicial will. By employing strict scruti-
ny review, the majority in Shapiro failed to undertake the discretionary and dis-
criminating process of evaluating the significance of the relevant State interests, as
well as the degree of infringement on the affected liberty. Inherent in the doctrine
of strict scrutiny, as it applies to regulations rather than proscriptions, cf. supra
note 132, is judicial will because it otherwise indiscriminately invalidates any in-
fringement on a fundamental right, thereby threatening the constitutional balance
of power.
Moreover, the differences between will and judgment are also present in the
context of deriving rights. For example, the doctrine of incorporation-a means of
restricting and expanding the reach of the Due Process Clause-was a doctrine that
prevented judges from exercising judgment when determining whether a right pro-
tected by the Bill of Rights was applicable against the states, see Duncan v. Louisi-
ana, 391 U.S. 145, 176 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting), or whether an unenumerated
liberty was entitled to constitutional protection, Poe, 367 U.S. at 543 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). If stringently applied, the incorporation doctrine would deny even mini-
mal constitutional protection to some types of conduct, thereby granting the political
majority unfettered authority to interfere with many individual liberties and violat-
ing separation of powers principles.
The proper exercise of judicial review is thus conditioned upon the exercise of
judgment in both deriving rights and evaluating the constitutionality of burdens
imposed on them. Formulas that reduce this process to a mechanical inquiry, such
as strict scrutiny review, rational basis review, and the dichotomies between funda-
mental and nonfimdamental rights, disturb the constitutional balance inherent in the
separation of powers doctrine. An informed approach to deriving unenumerated
rights, when accompanied by a meaningful balancing of competing interests, is the
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The Phoenix's Second Life: Griswold to Moore
Griswold v. Connecticut
5 4
In Griswold, the Supreme Court invalidated the Connecticut
contraceptive law that prompted Justice Harlan's dissent in
Poe." Still wary of substantive due process, the Court failed
to adopt Justice Harlan's theory. Instead, Justices Douglas and
Goldberg penned two competing approaches to unenumerated
rights analysis, both of which invalidated the law as a violation
of marital privacy. 6
Eisenstadt v. Baird
57
Seven years later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court addressed
the right of an unmarried person to receive contraceptive devic-
es. '5 Although the Court determined that the Fourteenth
Amendment protected this right, it did so on equal protection
grounds.' In explaining its decision, the Court characterized
the right of privacy as "the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child."6 ° With these words, the
foundation of Roe became constitutional doctrine.' 6'
most constitutionally legitimate method by which the judiciary can fulfill its obliga-
tion to protect individual liberties within a system of government dedicated to repub-
lican ideals.
154. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
155. Id. at 480, 486; see also Poe, 367 U.S. at 499 (reviewing the same Connecti-
cut statute).
156. Justice Douglas argued that the guarantees of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth,
and Ninth Amendments, when read together and applied by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, created a zone of privacy unjustifiably infringed by the Connecticut law.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-86. Justice Goldberg, on the other hand, relied on the
Ninth Amendment and constitutional precedent to interpret the liberty protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment to include a right of marital privacy. Id. at 486-87
(Goldberg, J., concurring).
157. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
158. Id. at 446-47.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 453 (emphasis added).
161. See DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND
THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 543 (1994) (reviewing commentary on Eisenstadt that
had concluded that Eisenstadt was "an unmistakably calculating effort to pave the
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Roe v. Wade162
The Supreme Court in Roe recognized that the right to priva-
cy, grounded in the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, was "broad enough to encom-
pass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her preg-
nancy."'163 After reviewing the history of abortion regula-
tion"' and relevant state interests, 6 ' the Court concluded
that the right to an abortion was qualified, 166 but that its sta-
tus within the fundamental right of privacy prevented its regula-
tion in the absence of a narrowly tailored regulation furthering a
compelling state interest.67
Despite its reliance on the Due Process Clause, the Roe deci-
sion was not entirely consistent with Justice Harlan's substan-
tive due process theory. In deriving the unenumerated right to a
previability abortion, the Roe majority circumvented the breadth
of the living constitutional tradition by failing to consider explic-
itly the balance between individual liberty and organized society
reflected in evolving societal traditions and practices.1 6' The
way for a constitutional right to choose abortion").
162. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
163. Id. at 153. Twelve years after Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Poe, the
Court accepted his contention that the Due Process Clause offered constitutional
protection for unenumerated rights. The Court did not, however, consider the right
to a previability abortion to be a liberty right. Id. Instead, the Court viewed the
decision to terminate a pregnancy as a component of the right to privacy protected
by the Due Process Clause. Id. at 154. Therefore, as Eisenstadt suggested, the right
to privacy sheltered individual activities involving reproductive autonomy and func-
tioned as an independent constitutional provision.
164. Id. at 129-52.
165. The Court found that a state's interests in safeguarding maternal health and
protecting potential life were important and, at some point in the pregnancy, compel-
ling. Id. at 154.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 155-56 (citing, ironically, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1968)).
Roe imported fundamental rights and strict scrutiny concepts into substantive due
process analysis. Utilizing strict scrutiny, the Court concluded that: during the first
trimester, the abortion decision was between a woman and her physician, id. at 164;
a state's interest in the health of the mother justified regulation of the abortion
procedure in ways "reasonably related to maternal health" after the first trimester,
id.; and a state's interest in potential life allowed postviabiity regulation and pro-
scription of abortion absent interference with the life or health of the mother, id. at
164-65. This framework invalidated a large number of abortion regulations. See, e.g.,
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
168. Although the Roe opinion surveyed the history of abortion regulation and
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Court also abandoned the Harlan model with respect to the level
of scrutiny to be given to abortion regulations,169 thereby dis-
discussed relevant societal trends, Roe, 410 U.S. at 129-52, it did not incorporate the
evolution of abortion regulation into its decision to recognize a right to a previability
abortion. Instead, the Court relied exclusively on constitutional precedent. Id. at 152-
54. Moreover, by locating the right to a previability abortion within the right to
privacy, id. at 153, the Court may have created an analytically distinct category of
unenumerated rights analysis, see supra note 163, in order to diminish the role of
societal and historical traditions in unenumerated rights analysis, see G. Sidney
Buchanan, A Ve:y Rational Court, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1509, 1567-68 (1993).
Under a proper conception of Justice Harlan's substantive due process theory,
however, consideration of the relevant social and historical evidence would have
suggested a right to a previability abortion. See Philip B. Heymann & Douglas E.
Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics, 53 B.U. L. REV.
765, 765-84 (1973). Initially, at common law, abortion was not illegal until the six-
teenth to eighteenth week of pregnancy. Roe, 410 U.S. at 132. Nonetheless, abortion
statutes designed to protect maternal health eventually prohibited abortions in most
contexts. Id. at 139. The balance between individual liberty and State authority
shifted again during the 1960s, however, as many states liberalized their abortion
regulations. Id. at 140. This reversal, when combined with the medical professions
broad interpretations of the more liberal statutes, see GARROW, supra note 161, at
374-75, indicated that, at the time of Roe, the practices and laws of the nation drew
a wavering line between a woman's liberty and State authority that allowed for:
abortions in some circumstances (rape, incest, danger to the life or health of the
mother) or possibly through a certain point in pregnancy; widespread regulation of
abortion; and prohibitions on abortion throughout a little more than half of pregnan-
cy. In addition, relevant precedent had developed the Constitution's dedication to
individual liberty by protecting reproductive decisions. Thus, the holding in Roe
could have stated explicitly that the elements of our living constitutional tradition
suggested a woman's right to an abortion during the early stages of pregnancy.
169. Although a law proscribing a constitutionally protected liberty right would be
subjected to strict scrutiny under Harlan's theory, see supra notes 128, 132 and ac-
companying text, regulating the exercise of that right would not, see supra notes
123, 129-30, 132 and accompanying text. Whereas the Roe trimester framework re-
quired a compelling State interest to justify an abortion regulation during pregnancy
and found the government's interests to be compelling at 12 weeks for reasons of
maternal health and at viability for the protection of potential life, a balancing ap-
proach would uphold properly tailored abortion regulations throughout pregnancy,
provided that the effect on the abortion right was outweighed by a sufficient State
interest.
Moreover, the balancing approach is consistent with the historical and societal
traditions recognized by the Roe majority. As the majority in Roe noted, abortion
regulation was being liberalized, not jettisoned, during the 1960s and early 1970s.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 140. Recognizing a right to a previability abortion was an incre-
mental broadening of a protected liberty justified by constitutional precedent protect-
ing reproductive decisions. Denying the State the power to regulate previability abor-
tions, however, was a significant departure from the evolving notion of the State's
constitutional authority to participate in the abortion decision. This departure led to
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rupting the constitutional balance maintained by a proper sepa-
ration of powers.
171
Moore v. City of East Cleveland
7 1
Although Roe was a seven-to-two decision, the Court's
unenumerated rights jurisprudence was losing its supporters
even when invoked in less controversial constitutional arenas. In
Moore, a five-to-four decision, the Court struck down a city ordi-
nance prohibiting a grandmother from living with her grandson
because it interfered with family privacy. 72 In deriving a right
of family privacy, the majority expressly invoked,' 7" and cor-
rectly applied, Justice Harlan's theory of substantive due pro-
cess.174 Ironically, the first Supreme Court decision to properly
apply substantive due process theory was also the last.75
the increasingly divisive abortion decisions of the 1980s and 1990s, see, e.g., Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2818 (1992) (rejecting the trimester framework
of Roe), and the abandonment of meaningful substantive due process review for
other possible aspects of liberty as well, see, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health
Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (failing to overrule Roe by one vote); Michael H. v. Ger-
ald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (rejecting a liberty right claim in a five-to-four decision);
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (rejecting a liberty right claim by a five-to-
four vote again).
170. The majority's indiscriminate use of strict scrutiny implicated the same sepa-
ration of powers concerns as those associated with the Court's holding in Shapiro.
See supra note 153.
171. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
172. Id. at 495-96, 506 (utilizing strict scrutiny review).
173. Id. at 501-02. By noting that substantive due process "counsels caution and
restraint ... not . . . abandonment," id. at 502, the Court recognized its role in
maintaining the constitutional balance between individual liberty and the essence of
popular government.
174. Reviewing the development of our constitutional purposes, the Court de-
scribed its precedent as protecting "choices concerning family living arrangements."
Id. at 499. Examining the balance struck between the family and the State through-
out our nation's history, the Court found that protection of "a larger conception of
the family," id. at 505, was "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," id.
at 503. The Court thus had no difficulty harmonizing the elements of our living
constitutional tradition and concluding that the right of a grandmother to live with
her grandson was part of this tradition. Furthermore, the Court appropriately in-
yoked strict scrutiny because the ordinance was a ban on a constitutionally protected
activity.
175. Although Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), explicitly invoked Justice
Harlan's theory, it is more appropriately placed within the genre of Court decisions
dealing with institutionalized persons.
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The Phoenix's Second Death: Bowers to Cruzan
Bowers v. Hardwick
7 1
Concerned with its constitutional legitimacy, 7 the Court in
Bowers v. Hardwick, another five-to-four decision, rejected both
the claim that the Due Process Clause protected a right to con-
sensual homosexual sodomy 17' and the Court's prior
unenumerated rights jurisprudence as applied in Roe and
Moore.79 By departing from Justice Harlan's model of substan-
tive due process, however, the Court's cure was far more consti-
tutionally infirm than the disease.
In Bowers, the Court designed a test for unenumerated rights
claims that constrained judicial discretion by focusing on tradi-
tion.80 The Court stated that a liberty right was protected only
when it was fundamental---"implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it
was] sacrificed"" 8 '-or when it was "deeply rooted in this
176. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
177. The Court was disturbed by what it perceived to be the role of personal
values in unenumerated rights analysis. See id. at 191. The Court noted that it was:
most vulnerable and ... nearest to illegitimacy when it deal[t] with
judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the
language or design of the Constitution .... [As a result] [t]here should
be . . . great resistance to expand[ing] the substantive reach of [the Due
Process Clause] .... Otherwise, the Judiciary necessarily takes to itself
further authority to govern the country without express constitutional
authority.
Id. at 194-95.
178. Id. at 189.
179. See id. at 194 (stating, "[n]or are we inclined .. . to discover new fundamen-
tal rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause").
180. See id. at 191-92; cf. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 549 (1977)
(White, J., dissentink) (stating that "[w]hat the deeply rooted traditions of the coun-
try are is arguable; which of them deserve the protection of the Due Process Clause
is even more debatable"). Justice White's inclinations in Moore were correct. The
Court's reliance on history and tradition cannot eliminate judicial discretion, nor can
it prevent a decisionmaking process shaped to some extent by a judge's personal
jurisprudence. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 137-41 (1989) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (noting that the selection of a tradition, its level of generality, its con-
tent, and its period of existence are all value judgments requiring as much discre-
tion as the recognition of fundamental rights through the use of reasoned judgment);
accord JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 60-63 (1980).
181. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-92 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26
(1937)).
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Nation's history and tradition."1 2
Although it retained the fundamental rights framework, the
Bowers analysis was the jurisprudential antithesis of Roe.
Whereas Roe had relied on a right to privacy that reduced the
role of tradition in unenumerated rights analysis, Bowers shifted
the focus of unenumerated rights claims to a liberty right
183
defined exclusively by tradition. This method of giving content to
the liberty of the Due Process Clause altered the judicial role by
forcing judges to resolve liberty claims on the basis of historical
inquiry rather than careful examination of constitutional prece-
dent and purposes.
In repudiating the Roe approach, however, the Court also
abandoned sound constitutional decisionmaking. By emphasizing
tradition over judicial reasoning, the Court characterized consti-
tutionally protected liberties as isolated instances of individual
conduct' and treated the Due Process Clause as nothing more
than a proxy for traditional, or once majoritarian, values.18
182. Id. at 192 (citing Moore, 431 U.S. at 503). This use of the Moore opinion
was incorrect. The Court in Moore looked at the evolution of our constitutional pur-
poses and found that protection of the family was "deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition." Moore, 431 U.S. at 503. This use of tradition, however, was
not the sole factor that determined whether the law challenged in Moore violated
substantive due process nor was it a precondition for such a finding. Rather, the
fact that the protection of the extended family was "deeply rooted" simply made it
easier for the Court to reconcile the two elements of our living constitutional tra-
dition and conclude that the family should be protected by the Due Process Clause.
183. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S..261, 279 n.7 (1990);
Buchanan, supra note 168, at 1570-72.
184. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-91 (describing the relevant constitutional prece-
dent and concluding that "none of the rights announced in those cases bears any
resemblance to the claimed constitutional right . . . . No connection between family,
marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has
been demonstrated."). But cf. id. at 203-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that
the Court's precedent, when read in conjunction, protected "sexual intimacy" and the
right to engage in consensual sodomy).
185. See id. at 192-94 (noting that, until 1961, all 50 states outlawed sodomy but
that, by 1986, only 24 states and the District of Columbia retained their sodomy
bans). The majority's reliance on a minority position indicated a very cramped notion
of tradition: once a majority of states bans an activity, that activity can never be af-
forded constitutional protection through the Due Process Clause unless a majority of
states pass laws protecting that activity. A tradition is not created when a majority
of states repeal criminal laws prohibiting a certain type of conduct.
This approach ignored the notion of a living constitutional tradition by failing to
consider the evolution of societal views, as expressed in law, of the proper authority
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The Bowers opinion not only ended meaningful substantive due
process analysis; it also exacerbated the problems associated
with the Court's previous analysis by retaining a scrutiny frame-
work that violated the constitutional separation of powers.'86
Michael H. v. Gerald D.1
8 7
The Court recognized the problems with its Bowers frame-
work. Unfortunately, in responding to the retention of the "fun-
damental rights" dichotomy in Bowers, the Court failed to cor-
rect these problems in a manner consistent with the Court's role
in maintaining the constitutional balance of power."
of the State and the liberty of the individual. See id. at 199-200 (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting). Moreover, by denying protection to a liberty right not already protected by
a majority of the states, the Bowers test reduced the Due Process Clause to consti-
tutional surplusage. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) (Brennan,
J., dissenting). Under the Court's conception of the Due Process Clause in Bowers,
the reach of judicial review was substantially shortened, for unenumerated rights
challenges could only be successful when unnecessary.
186. The problems associated with substantive due process prior to Moore
stemmed from the use of strict scrutiny to strike both bans on, and regulations of,
protected liberty rights. The indiscriminate use of the power of judicial review, not
the Court's recognition of protected liberties, resulted in a slft in the constitutional
balance. Yet, the Court in Bowers eliminated the ability of the federal courts to
recognize new liberties and retained, when it should have rejected, the strict scruti-
ny framework for evaluating infringements on protected liberty rights.
The Bowers test for substantive due process violated the constitutional doctrine
of separation of powers in a manner exactly the opposite of that in Roe. Whereas
the Roe formulation of unenumerated rights analysis was an exercise of a judicial
"will-to-power," see NIETZCHE, supra note 1, at 135, the Bowers articulation was an
exercise of a judicial "will-to-nothingness," see id. at 122; see also CHARLES FRIED,
ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION-A FIRSTHAND AccoUNT 81-82
(1991) (describing Bowers as a "flight from reason"). In Roe, the Court utilized a
broad framework for recognizing fundamental rights and strict scrutiny to strike
down all infringements on those rights. In Bowers, however, the Court ensured that
few, if any, liberties would be deemed fundamental and that government regulation
of individual liberties not within the scope of the Bill of Rights, even if justified by
only traditional notions of Judeo-Christian morality, would be upheld under rational
basis review. The Bowers test therefore eliminated meaningful judicial review and
promoted judicial abdication by equating judicial legitimacy with almost absolute
deference to the democratic process. The Bowers test thus abolished the Court's role
in maintaining the constitutional balance between individual liberty and the spirit
and form of popular government, thereby violating separation of powers principles.
187. 491 U.S. 110 (upholding a California law presuming a child born to a
married woman living with her husband to be the husband's child).
188. As a response to the two-tier scrutiny associated with the fundamental rights
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In Michael H. v. Gerald D., a fragmented five-to-four decision,
Justice Scalia recognized that the use of tradition in Bowers in-
vited a judge to rely upon personal values when interpreting the
Constitution."9 Although his opinion did not garner a majority,
it revealed strong support for further refining the Bowers test
and limited support for further constraining the process of deriv-
ing unenumerated rights by eradicating judicial discretion in the
selection of tradition.' 90 In contrast to the Bowers test, which
was satisfied when either of its prongs was met,'9' Justice
Scalia articulated a two-part test for the recognition of a consti-
tutionally protected form of liberty."2 Moreover, the basis of
the first half of the test was a constrained historical inquiry de-
signed to counter the role of judgment in substantive due pro-
cess analysis.9 Although Justice Scalia did not specify the
doctrine, the Court has viewed the rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
as liberty interests. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261
(1990); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). Although this approach had the
potential to supplement the rigid strict scrutiny/rational basis dichotomy with a
middle tier of scrutiny or a discriminating balancing test, the Court instead has
protected liberty interests in a manner consistent with rational basis review. See
Buchanan, supra note 168, at 1509; supra note 28.
189. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 128 n.6 (stating that, because "general traditions
provide such imprecise guidance, they permit judges to dictate rather than discern
society's views"). This footnote was the only part of Justice Scalia's opinion not
joined by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy. Id. at 132.
190. Ironically, Justice Scalia invoked Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in
Griswold to support his articulation of the role of tradition in substantive due pro-
cess analysis. Id. at 122-23.
191. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986).
192. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 122 (stating that, in order for a liberty right to be
protected by the Due Process Clause, it must be "fundamental" and a right that has
"also ...traditionally [been] protected by our society") (emphasis added). This two-
part test further contorted the Court's Due Process Clause framework by suggesting
that a right traditionally protected and fundamental should be treated as a "liberty
interest." Id. at 127 ("This is not the stuff of which fundamental rights qualifying as
liberty interests are made."). Infringements on liberty interests, however, were sub-
jected to less scrutiny than were infringements on fundamental rights. See, e.g.,
supra note 28. Because liberty interests were "protected" by levels of scrutiny resem-
bling rational basis review, a ban on a fundamental right qualifying as a liberty
interest would be constitutionally permissible under Justice Scalia's formulation of
the due process inquiry, but not under Bowers.
193. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6 (suggesting that judicial restraint and con-
stitutional legitimacy would be served by limiting the substantive due process inqui-
ry to "the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying
protection to, the asserted right can be identified").
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level of scrutiny that would have been applied to a liberty right
that survived his analytical framework, his approach, if it had
been adopted, would have further narrowed the opportunity for
meaningful judicial review of individual liberties, thereby exac-
erbating the separation of powers implications of Bowers.'94
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health9 '
Left without a clear approach to deriving unenumerated
rights in the aftermath of three five-to-four decisions, the Court
in Cruzan splintered on the issue of an appropriate substantive
due process framework.'96 Although the plurality adopted a
balancing test, any resemblance that this approach bore to Jus-
tice Harlan's theory was superficial, for the plurality failed to
properly derive the unenumerated right.'97 Moreover, because
the balancing test employed by the plurality was not calibrated
in a meaningful manner,198 it improperly shifted the constitu-
tional balance through the exercise of judicial will.'99
194. The substantive due process framework adopted in Bowers violated the con-
stitutional separation of powers by severely restricting the Court's ability to derive
unenumerated rights and by subjecting nonfundamental liberties to rational basis
review. The model advocated by Justice Scalia compounded this error by further
curtailing the Court's ability to derive and protect unenumerated liberties.
195. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
196. See supra notes 27-42 and accompanying text.
197. Compare supra notes 27-28 (discussing the reasoning of the Cruzan plurality
opinion) with supra notes 109-40 (discussing Justice Harlan's model of substantive
due process).
198. See supra note 28.
199. The plurality opinion violated separation of powers principles in two ways.
First, by assuming, rather than recognizing, a constitutional right to refuse medical
treatment, the plurality indicated an unwillingness to derive unenumerated rights.
Second, by calibrating the balance in a manner similar to rational basis review, the
plurality further suggested that it was unwilling to engage in any form of meaning-
ful judicial review. See Buchanan, supra note 168, at 1509. In addition, Justice
Scalia's rigid adherence to the text of the Constitution also indicated more than an
unwillingness to derive unenumerated rights. Although the Court may have been
correct in upholding the clear and convincing evidence requirement because of the
importance of the State interest in safeguarding the decisionmaking process, Cruzan,
497 U.S. at 280-82, the manner in which it reached its conclusion revealed a defer-
ence to the democratic process that is inconsistent with the Court's role within our
system of separated powers.
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The Phoenix's Third Life?: Planned Parenthood v. Casey..
In Casey, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to repudiate
conclusively substantive due process by overturning its most
symbolic vestige, Roe v. Wade.2"' Instead, Justices Blackmun
and Stevens concurred in parts of an extraordinary joint opinion
by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter that invoked Justice
Harlan's theory of substantive due process 2 and upheld the
"central holding" of Roe.2"3
Applying Justice Harlan's theory, the joint opinion reaffirmed a
woman's right to a previability abortion on the basis of the right's
relationship to constitutional principles. 4 and their develop-
ment through relevant precedent. °5 Consistent with Justice
Harlan's model, these Justices also struck down the trimester
framework and its connection to strict scrutiny."' By replacing
this framework with an undue burden standard, however, the
authors of the joint opinion incorrectly applied Justice Harlan's
approach to balancing and the separation of powers doctrine.0 7
200. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
201. Id. at 2803-05 (joint opinion) (considering and rejecting the incorporation and
most-specific-tradition approaches to substantive due process as inconsistent with the
nature of the Constitution as illustrated by the Ninth Amendment).
202. Id. at 2805, 2806, 2811.
203. Id. at 2821.
204. Id. at 2805 ("It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of
personal liberty which the government may not enter.").
205. Id. at 2807, 2810-11; see inf'a notes 229-57 and accompanying text. Because
the Court did not confront for the first time in Casey the argument for a constitu-
tionally protected right to a previability abortion but evaluated Roe and the consti-
tutionality of state legislation enacted pursuant to that decision, an inquiry into the
evolution of state laws and practices as an expression of constitutional tradition was
implicit in the decision.
206. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2817-19. The trimester framework and its relationship
to strict scrutiny undervalued the important State interests accepted by the Roe
majority-protection of maternal health and protection of potential life-by prevent-
ing the State from pursuing these interests through previability regulations. Id. By
eliminating strict scrutiny review of some previability abortion regulations but main-
taining it for others, the joint opinion moved toward a constitutionally legitimate
balancing of interests.
207. Rather than adopt a carefully calibrated balancing test, the Justices ex-
plained that an abortion regulation placing an undue burden on the abortion deci-
sion would be struck down. Id. at 2820. The Court defined an undue burden as a
law having "the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus." Id.; cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
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Nonetheless, as the narrowest unenumerated rights theory
sustaining a woman's right to a previability abortion, Justice
Harlan's substantive due process framework was catapulted into
a position of interpretive preeminence by the joint opinion. The
Casey decision therefore represents, with the exception of Moore,
the Supreme Court's most accurate application of Justice
Harlan's views and, consequently, its most constitutionally legit-
imate exercise of substantive due process.
Justice Harlan's Theory of Substantive Due Process As the
Constitutional Standard
The Supreme Court's substantive due -process jurisprudence
and its quest for legitimacy have come full circle since Roe, as
Justice Harlan's theory of substantive due process once again
anchors the Court's approach to the Due Process Clause. A num-
ber of approaches to substantive due process, developed in a
string of five-to-four decisions, however, remain, and the Court
has not indicated the criteria that determine which framework
U.S. 618, 674 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (defining an undue burden as the point
when, in the balancing of interests, a state's interests and their effectuation through
regulation are outweighed by the burden imposed on a protected liberty).
Although the authors of the joint opinion did not indicate how the undue bur-
den standard related to the previous strict scrutiny/rational basis dichotomy found in
fundamental rights analysis, the implication was clear: whereas traditional strict
scrutiny would strike down virtually any infringement of a fundamental right, the
undue burden test would subject only substantial obstacles, including a ban, to strict
scrutiny. Other regulations based on legitimate interests would receive rational basis
review. See Elizabeth A. Schneider, Comment, Workability of the Undue 'Burden Test,
66 TEMP. L. REV. 1003, 1027 (1993). In essence, the undue burden standard reflects
a refined strict scrutiny/rational basis framework-one that requires a greater degree
of infringement of a liberty right in order to trigger strict scrutiny review, rather
than a balancing test. Although the undue burden standard is not entirely consistent
with separation of powers aoctrine, it represents a more constitutionally legitimate
accommodation of State and individual interests than does the use of strict scrutiny
in Roe and the use of the rational basis test in Bowers.
It remains to be seen, however, if the undue burden standard will be utilized in
other unenumerated rights contexts or in other areas of constitutional law. Casey,
112 S. Ct. at 2878-80 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the joint opinion did
not address this issue but that the undue burden standard should be limited to the
abortion context). But see Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454
(W.D. Wash. 1994) (adopting the undue burden standard in the assisted suicide con-
text), rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.), reh'g en banc granted, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir.
1995).
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applies to a particular case. This phenomenon has tarnished the
Supreme Court's constitutional legitimacy by implying that the
Justices select and shape interpretive standards based on the
results that they want to reach in particular cases. Furthermore,
many of the approaches are constitutionally illegitimate because
they disregard the balance between individual liberty and the
spirit of republican government embedded in the Constitution.
Adoption of Justice Harlan's theory would enhance the Court's
constitutional legitimacy by reducing the perception of the Court
as results-oriented and by harmonizing the Court's substantive
due process jurisprudence with the Constitution's commitment
to separation of powers principles. Justice Harlan's theory of
substantive due process is therefore the constitutionally appro-
priate standard for interpreting the Due Process Clause and will
be utilized to derive the constitutionally protected RTDWD. °'
DERIVING THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT To DIE WITH DIGNITY
In order for an unenumerated liberty to receive protection
under the Due Process Clause, it must be placed within the
contours of our living constitutional tradition, which is shaped
by our constitutional principles and their development. A priori,
an unenumerated liberty must be clearly defined as a product of
this living constitutional tradition. In its current form, however,
the RTDWD is neither clearly defined nor the product of our
living constitutional tradition.
Despite its prominent perch in American consciousness, the
RTDWD is a poorly defined liberty. Because different influences
shape its definition in different contexts, 9 courts, scholars,
and members of the medical community have disagreed about its
meaning.21° Yet, these definitions share an internal inconsis-
208. Nevertheless, the choice of a different Fourteenth Amendment framework
does not diminish the force of the following arguments, it merely channels them
toward a characterization of the RTDWD as fundamental and a description of tra-
dition that cannot supplant this depiction.
209. See, e.g., Robert A. Sedler, Constitutional Challenges to Bans on "Assisted
Suicide": The View from Without and Within, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 777 (1994)
(distinguishing the right to PAS advocated by the Michigan ACLU from Dr.
Kevorkian's arguments and actions).
210. Compare Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1462 (holding that "a com-
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tency: they arbitrarily limit the reach of the RTDWD when the
interests underlying the right do not imply such limitations. An
advocate for the RTDWD can avoid these analytical pratfalls,
however, by arguing for the right at its most philosophically
consistent and powerful level, thereby elevating the interests
underlying the right to their appropriate constitutional status
and placing the RTDWD squarely within the liberty protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
Properly defined, the RTDWD is the right of a competent
individual to control the circumstances surrounding her
death. 11 This right includes not only the right to refuse medi-
cal treatment, but also a right to PAS and, in some cases,
PCE.21 Underlying this right are three interrelated individual
interests: self-determination, including the right to life in its
broadest sense and the rights of bodily integrity and freedom of
conscience; dignity; and the mitigation of suffering.13 Thus de-
fined, the RTDWD is intertwined with our living constitutional
tradition and entitled to constitutional protection because it is
based on our Constitution's respect for liberty, the definition of
liberty found in constitutional precedent, and society's evolving
conception of the proper balance between individual liberty and
state authority as reflected by our laws and practices.
Constituftional Purposes (As Perceived)
The Constitution represents a careful balancing of two poten-
tially conflicting principles inherent in a free society- individu-
al liberty and the "spirit and the form of popular govern-
ment."214 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
petent, terminally ill adult has a constitutionally guaranteed right under the Four-
teenth Amendment to commit physician-assisted suicide") and Quill et al., supra
note 14, at 1381 (suggesting that physicians should be able to aid their competent
and incurably suffering and terminally ill patients in committing suicide) with Thom-
as J. Marzen, "Out, Out Brief Candle": Constitutionally Prescribed Suicide for the
Terminally Ill, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 799 (1994) (arguing that, because the RTD
is based on the common law of battery and informed consent, it includes only the
right to refuse medical treatment).
211. See supra note 3.
212. See supra note 3.
213. See supra note 12.
214. See supra note 141.
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ment, as a microcosm of this balance,"' requires the Supreme
Court, when confronted with an unenumerated rights claim, to
exercise the power of judicial review in a manner that is consis-
tent with this balance and that properly respects both of its
components. Although "there can be no doubt that the meaning
of 'liberty' must be broad indeed," 16 the Supreme Court often
has focused solely on the Constitution's commitment to demo-
cratic government when considering unenumerated rights
claims, thereby undermining the Constitution's dedication to
individual liberty.2 17 A proper analysis of constitutional purpos-
es in the context of an unenumerated rights claim therefore
requires an understanding of constitutional theory as it relates
to the scope of the term "liberty."
In Two Treatises of Government, John Locke argued that gov-
ernment existed as a response to the perils of its theoretical
alternative-the state of nature. He noted that:
[Mian in the state of nature . . . [is] absolute lord of his own
person and possessions . . . . [Yet the enjoyment of [his ab-
solute freedom] is very uncertain . . . [because it is] constant-
ly exposed to the invasion of others .... [Therefore,] he seeks
out and is willing to join in society with others who are al-
ready united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual preser-
vation of their lives [and] liberties.21
According to Locke, the purpose of government is to protect
individual rights and liberties, which are insecure in the state of
nature because of the unchecked liberty and power of others.
Constructing a government capable of protecting these liber-
ties but incapable of tyranny was, however, a difficult task. The
Constitutional Convention attempted to meet this challenge by
creating a government of limited powers. According to Federalist
theory, a government of limited powers does not threaten indi-
vidual liberties because its authority is constrained by its enu-
215. See supra note 125.
216. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 546 (1977) (White, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972)).
217. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 186 (1986).
218. JOHN LocKE, TWo TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 184 (Thomas I. Cook ed.,
1947) (emphasis added).
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merated powers.219 The logical force of this theory is dimin-
ished, however, by the presence of specific exceptions to govern-
ment authority in Article I of the Constitution. ° Seizing on
these examples, the Anti-Federalists argued that government is
not limited by its enumerated powers and that liberties not
specifically enumerated in Article I were threatened by the pro-
posed Constitution.22'
Although the Constitution was ratified, James Madison urged
the First Congress to respond to these concerns by proposing the
Bill of Rights. Introducing the first eight amendments, he noted:
It cannot be a secret. . . that ... there is a great number of
our constituents who are dissatisfied with [the Constitution];
among whom are many... respectable for the jealousy they
have for their liberty, which, though mistaken in its object, is
laudable in its motive .... We ought not... disregard their
inclination but... [should instead] expressly declare the
great rights of mankind secured under this constitution.222
The decision to introduce a limited number of amendments re-
vived Anti-Federalist concerns that a partial enumeration of
individual liberties would not protect the panoply of retained
liberties because "there [was] great reason to fear that a posi-
tive declaration of some of the most essential rights could not
be obtained in the requisite latitude."2 ' The First Congress
219. See THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 513-15 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
220. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (providing that tile "privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended"); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3
(providing that "[n]o Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed"); see
also THE FEDERALIST No. 84, supra note 219, at 511-15 (reviewing Anti-Federalist
arguments against the Constitution and other specific exceptions to government
authority).
221. See THE FEDERALIST No. 84, supra note 219, at 513-14 (reviewing and reject-
ing the argument: "why . . . should it be said that the liberty of the press shall not
be restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be imposed?").
222. GALES & SEATON, supra note 138, at 108 (emphasis added).
223. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1778), in 1 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 477 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). James
Wilson expressed similar sentiments when he addressed the Pennsylvania Ratifying
Convention: "In all societies, there are many . . . rights which cannot be particularly
enumerated .... I consider that there are very few who understand the whole of
these rights. All the political writers . . . have treated on this subject; but [none
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thus was faced with a constitution unable to fulfill its primary
purpose-protecting individual liberties-because the Bill of
Rights was incapable of adequately circumscribing government
authority.
In response to these concerns, James Madison proposed what
would become the Ninth Amendment. He stated:
It has been objected ... against a bill of rights, that, by
enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it
would disparage those rights which were not placed in that
enumeration; and... by implication, that those rights which
were not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the
hands of the General Government, and were consequently
insecure.224
However, Madison also added that "Itihe exceptions here or
elsewhere in the constitution, made in favor of particular rights,
shall not be so construed as to diminish the just importance of
other rights retained by the people."' As a result, the Ninth
Amendment indicates not only that substantive due process
cannot be limited by the incorporation doctrine226 but also that,
in light of the political theories of Locke, Paine, and Madison,
substantive due process should be viewed as a constitutional
mandate requiring the courts to interpret the liberty protected
by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to protect "individual rights [not] fully derivable from [a]
single [constitutional] provision but implicit in several, or in the
structure of the Bill of Rights as a whole." 7
The balance between individual liberty and principles of re-
publican government expressed in the Constitution is premised
has] . . . complete[ly] enumerat[ed the] rights appertaining to the people .... " Id.,
in 1 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra, at 454.
224. GALES & SEATON, supra note 138, at 115.
225. Id. at 111.
226. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2805 (1992); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 491-92 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring); LAURENCE H.
TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DOR', ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 53-54 (1991).
227. Laurence H. Tribe, Contrasting Constitutional Visions: Of Real and Unreal
Differences, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 95, 107 (1987); cf. supra notes 109-23 and
accompanying text (discussing Justice Harlan's views on the derivation of
unenumerated rights).
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on the view that our system of government is "built upon postu-
lates of respect for the liberty of the individual."2" The possi-
bility of a constitutionally protected RTDWD is thus inherent in
the Constitution's dedication to individual liberty. To conclude
that such a right exists, however, one must examine the devel-
opment of the Constitution's dedication to individual liberty.
Constitutional Purposes (As Developed)
Supreme Court Precedent
Whether the RTDWD is a part of our living constitutional
tradition depends to a large extent upon its relationship to rele-
vant constitutional precedent. Fidelity to our constitutional vi-
sion is not maintained, however, merely by examining the simi-
larities between the RTDWD and other constitutionally protect-
ed liberties. Rather, the Constitution's dedication to individual
liberty requires that an unenumerated rights inquiry into the
development of constitutional purposes be a broad one, looking
not only to the individual liberties protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment and other constitutional provisions, but also to the
purposes behind these provisions and the individual interests
underlying recognized liberties. Placing an unenumerated liberty
within our living constitutional tradition, therefore, depends
upon establishing its resemblance to previously recognized liber-
ties, the extent to which the interests it protects are in accord
with the purposes of our constitutional provisions, and the de-
gree of protection these interests have received in other contexts.
An inquiry into constitutional precedent that is narrower in
scope ignores the notion of liberty advanced by the Constitution.
The Court in Casey recognized the role of constitutional pur-
pose in framing substantive due process decisions.229 Conse-
quently, the Court conducted a broad inquiry into the relation-
ship between the previability abortion right and the sphere of
liberty protected by constitutional precedent."0 The Court ulti-
228. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
229. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2806.
230. Id. at 2807-08, 2810-11.
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mately concluded that the right to a previability abortion was
protected by the Due Process Clause because the interests un-
derlying this right were within the constitutional principle uni-
fying three separate, yet overlapping, conceptions of the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause and other constitutional
provisions."'
An inquiry into whether the RTDWD merits constitutional
protection should thus begin with a comparison of the individual
interests underlying this right and the three strands of liberty
identified by the Casey joint opinion because, as the district
court in Compassion in Dying noted, the "reasoning in Casey [is]
highly instructive and almost prescriptive on the ... issue [of
the RTDWD]." ' 2 Nonetheless, because the Court in Casey was
not confronted with the RTDWD, the individual interests under-
lying its holding are an illustrative, rather than exhaustive, list
of relevant constitutionally protected interests. Consideration of
Supreme Court decisions interpreting the First, Fourth, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendments bolsters the conclusion that there
is a constitutionally protected RTDWD.
Decisional Autonomy and the Right To Die with Dignity
The first strand of liberty identified by the Court in Casey
involved a string of substantive due process decisions exempli-
fied by Griswold. 3 The Court noted that these decisions, in-
cluding Roe, protected a sphere of liberty relating to intimate
relationships, the family, and decisions about "whether to bear
or beget a child." 4 Considered together, the components of
this strand of liberty demonstrate constitutional protection for
an individual's right to make important decisions regarding the
course of her life. 5 This strand of liberty therefore encompass-
231. Id. at 2807.
232. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1459, rev'd, 49 F.3d
586 (9th Cir.), reh'g en banc granted, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995).
233. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2810-11 (reviewing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431
U.S. 678 (1977); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
234. Id. at 2807 (quoting Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453).
235. See id.; see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 218 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
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es an individual's intertwined interests in self-determination
and the framing of a life plan, 6 which are two of the individu-
al interests underlying the right to make one of life's most im-
portant decisions-the decision to die.
Placing an individual's interest in living the remainder of her
life "in the woods" 7 within this strand of constitutionally pro-
tected liberty is further suggested by an examination of the
interests protected by the First Amendment. In West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette,"5 the Court interpreted
the First Amendment as "[reserving] from all official control""
the "sphere of [individual] intellect and spirit."24" As a result,
the Court held that the role of government in shaping individual
lives was to be a limited one. The First Amendment prohibited
the government, for example, from "prescrib[ing] what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or forc[ing] citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein."24' Echoing the holding in Barnette, Justice Douglas's
opinion in Doe v. Bolton242 indicated that the First Amendment
also prevented the government from interfering with an
individual's "autonomous control over the development and ex-
pression of [his] intellect, interests, tastes, and personality." '243
The right to control the circumstances surrounding one's
death implicates these First Amendment protections because the
psychological security provided by the RTDWD is essential to
one's ability to live in a personally meaningful way.244 When
dissenting); supra notes 157-61 and accompanying text (discussing Eisenstadt).
236. See supra notes 4-11 and accompanying text.
237. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
238. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
239. Id. at 642.
240. Id.; see also Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (Marshall, J., concur-
ring) ("The First Amendment serves .. .the needs of ... the human spirit.").
241. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
242. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
243. Id. at 211 (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted). Justice Brennan held
the same views. See GARROW, supra note 161, at 535-36 (reviewing the genesis of
Justice Douglas's concurring opinion).
244. See supra notes 4-11 and accompanying text; see also C. Edwin Baker, Scope
of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 966 (1978) (sug-
gesting that the First Amendment can be interpreted as protecting conduct that
fosters individual self-realization and self-determination without improperly interfer-
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an individual is denied this security by a law prescribing what is
orthodox in death, the government has invaded the realm of
individual spirit and substantially diminished an individual's
ability to control the course of her life.245 This type of restric-
tion on an individual's ability to make important decisions deter-
mining the course of her life is thus inconsistent with the strand
of individual liberty associated with Griswold and its affinity to
the purposes of the First Amendment.
Autonomy, Bodily Integrity, and the Right To Die with
Dignity
The second strand of liberty that the Court recognized in
Casey involved the protection of an individual's interests in
autonomy and bodily integrity.246 Developed primarily through
cases involving medical treatment,247 these interests, in their
narrowest formulation, consistently have protected one aspect of
the RTDWD-the right to refuse medical treatment.248
Autonomy and bodily integrity, however, also serve as justifi-
cations for a woman's right to a previability abortion. 49 They
complement the right of self-determination protected by
Griswold and its progeny by protecting both a right to make
important decisions regarding one's body and a right to medical
assistance in having those decisions implemented."0 Because
the RTDWD incorporates the right to refuse medical treatment,
is a decision predicated on notions of personal autonomy and
ing with the legitimate claims of others).
245. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2806 (1992) (foreshad-
owing the invalidation of such a law by questioning the proposition that a state can
"resolve . . . [profound moral, spiritual and] philosophic[al] questions in such a defin-
itive way that a [person] lacks all choice in the matter").
246. Id. at 2810.
247. See id. (reviewing Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261
(1990); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197
U.S. 11 (1905)); see also Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (utilizing the Fourth
Amendment to prevent the surgical removal of a bullet from an unwilling patient):
Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) ("No right is held more sacred,
or is more carefully guarded . . . than the right of every individual to the possession
and control of his own person ... .
248. See infra note 254.
249. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2810.
250. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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bodily integrity, and requires medical assistance to be exercised,
it is a right consisteiit with this strand of liberty.
Mitigation of Suffering and the Right To Die with Dignity
A woman's right to a previability abortion is not justified
solely by her interests in self-determination, autonomy, and
bodily integrityY The Casey decision indicated that the right
to a previability abortion constituted a unique thread of individ-
ual liberty, 2 justified in large part by concerns for a woman's
suffering. 3 The Court described a pregnant woman's suffering
as:
too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without
more, upon its own vision of the woman's role, however
dominant that vision has been in the course of our history
and our culture. The destiny of the woman must be shaped
to a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual
imperatives . *.. 254
An individual's interest in mitigating suffering, in addition to
autonomy and integrity concerns, is thus an important justifica-
tion for a right to medical intervention as a component of indi-
vidual libertyY5
Intimate and personal suffering, however, is not confined to
the context of pregnancy. A person confronting death or an in-
curable and debilitating disease, for example, may also experi-
ence, and wish to avoid, both physical and spiritual suffer-
ing." 6 In this circumstance, an individual's decision to hasten
251. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2810-11 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)).
252. See id.
253. See id. at 2807.
254. Id. A person's interest in mitigating suffering is thus essential to an accurate
understanding of individual liberty and the limits of legal and societal practices in
shaping that liberty. See id. Similarly, under the rubric of "evolving standards of
decency," concerns for human suffering can also justify departures from widely ac-
cepted societal practices. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976) (constru-
ing the Eighth Amendment and quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
255. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807.
256. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1460 (W.D.
Wash. 1994), rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.), reh'g en bane granted, 62 F.3d 299 (9th
Cir. 1995); see also Quill, supra note 4 (describing the case of Diane); Timothy E.
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death with medical assistance is shaped by a deeply personal
notion of the value of life compared with the suffering that it
entails. This decision therefore must be entrusted primarily to
her judgment.
Personal Dignity and the Right To Die with Dignity
Although notions of individual dignity reverberate in the
Court's discussions of autonomy, bodily integrity, and suffering,
the Casey opinion did not address specifically the dignity inter-
est underlying the RTDWD as an independent aspect of the
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause."8 Nonetheless,
personal dignity in the context of death is protected explicitly by
Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Fourteenth and
Eighth Amendments. 9
In her concurring opinion in Cruzan, Justice O'Connor drew
on the Court's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment jurispru-
dence, stating that "[r]equiring a competent adult to endure
[medical treatment] against her will burdens [her interests in]
liberty, dignity, and freedom .... Accordingly, the liberty guar-
anteed by the Due Process Clause must protect, if it protects
anything, an individual's deeply personal decision to reject medi-
cal treatment . . . ."' Although the entire Cruzan decision,
when read carefully, suggests that medical decisions implicating
death are protected because they involve questions of human
dignity,261 explicit constitutional protection for a dying person's
interest in dignity can be found in the Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of the Eighth Amendment." 2
Quill, Doctor. I Want To Die. Will You Help Me?, 270 JAMA 870 (1993) (describing
the suffering of those facing death).
257. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807.
258. See id.
259. See. e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 289 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (plurality opinion),
vacated, 429 U.S. 875 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
260. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see also
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1989) (stating that
the Fourth Amendment protects individual dignity).
261. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261.
262. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173; Furman, 408 U.S. at 270 (Brennan, J., concurring).
[Vol. 37:827
RIGHT TO DIE WITH DIGNITY
Notwithstanding the Court's rejection of constitutional chal-
lenges to modern methods of execution,263 several Justices
have stated that the Eighth Amendment protects the basic "dig-
nity of man" in the process of dying."4 Paralleling an
individual's constitutionally protected interest in mitigating
suffering, this dignity interest protects, at a minimum, an
individual's interest in avoiding a "lingering death."265 Corre-
spondingly, the Eighth Amendment prohibits a government from
inflicting unnecessary pain and suffering during the dying pro-
cess 266 and from deliberately denying prisoners medical assis-
tance that would alleviate their pain and suffering.
267
The Eighth Amendment, therefore, explicitly protects one of
the key interests underlying the RTDWD and demonstrates a
constitutional commitment to the prevention of government
action that causes an individual to suffer unnecessary pain or a
lingering death, such as laws confining a person's right to con-
trol his own death to the process of starvation.'6 It would be
contrary to principles of constitutional interpretation and sadly
ironic for the Court to utilize the Eighth Amendment to protect
only those committing the most heinous crimes while denying
the benefit of the humanity underlying this constitutional provi-
sion to those sentenced by life itself to struggle with the cruelty
of the human condition.269
263. See Deborah W. Denno, Is Electrocution an Unconstitutional Method of Exe-
cution? The Engineering of Death over the Centuiy, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 551,
614 (1994).
264. See. e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173; Furman, 408 U.S. at 270 (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion).
265. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) (stating that "[p]unishments are
cruel when they involve . . . lingering death").
266. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976); Louisiana ex rel. Francis
v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947) (plurality opinion).
267. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-05.
268. See Feiger, supra note 16, at 670.
269. See id.
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The Conduct Protected by the Right to a Previability
Abortion, the Right To Die, and the Right To Die with
Dignity
Although every interest underlying the RTDWD has received
constitutional protection, a review of constitutional purposes
would be incomplete without an examination of the contours of a
woman's right to a previability abortion and the implications of
an individual's right to refuse or withdraw medical treatment.
When considered together, the interests underlying the RTDWD,
as well as the specific types of conduct already protected by
these interests, yield a conception of liberty that recognizes a
right to control the circumstances surrounding death.
The rights recognized in the Roe, Casey, and Cruzan decisions
indicate that "a State's interest in the protection of life falls
short of justifying any plenary override of individual liberty
claims."2 "° This principle's protection of conduct in the abortion
context provides strong support for a constitutionally protected
RTDWD.
Abortion is an act "unique to the human condition.""2 ' Be-
cause one can view the right to a previability abortion as a liber-
ty involving medical assistance in the termination of potential
life, this right forms a distinctive strand of liberty protected by
the Constitution, and is based on a balancing of interests like no
other in constitutional law."2 The individual liberty on the
woman's side of the scale implicates constitutionally significant
interests in self-determination, personal autonomy, bodily integ-
rity, and the mitigation of suffering."3 The balancing analogy,
however, is not entirely suited to the issue of a woman's right to
an abortion because, unlike most constitutional balances that
weigh an individual's liberty interest against the State's counter-
vailing interests,274 the interests arrayed against a woman's
liberty are not simply those of the State.7 5
270. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2810 (1992) (citations
omitted).
271. Id. at 2807.
272. See id.
273. See id.
274. See. e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985).
275. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807.
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Instead, the conflicting interests of a "quasi-third party," the
fetus,2' 6 are subsumed in the State's interest in protecting po-
tential life and weighed against those of the woman.' The
law, however, generally restricts the scope of individual liberty
in an effort to prevent harm to third parties."' The act of abor-
tion does not, and should not be forced to, fit within this general
model. 9 Similarly, because of the presence of the fetus, the
act of abortion cannot be construed strictly as an act of self-re-
garding behavior.' ° The right to a previability abortion, as an
accommodation of these uniquely conflicting interests, is thus
strong support for the principle that the State's interest in life,
even when based on the potential life of a quasi-third party,
cannot override entirely the exercise of an individual liberty
requiring morally controversial medical assistance. 1
Consequently, if supplementing the State's interest in life
with the interests of a quasi-third party cannot tilt the constitu-
tional balance in favor of the State, then the removal of the
quasi-third party interest from this balance, all other factors
being equal, 2 would result in a significant shift in favor of in-
dividual liberty. The RTDWD results from such a shift.
The RTDWD is similar to a woman's right to a previability
abortion in three constitutionally significant ways. First, every
interest underlying a woman's right to a previability abortion
also supports an individual's RTDWD. 3 Second, like the right
276. For the purposes of this analysis, a previability fetus is considered to be a
quasi-third party because, although it cannot be a person within the meaning of the
Constitution, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973), it is an entity that can be
distinguished from the mother.
277. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807.
278. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.185-.205 (West 1987) (homicide); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 97-3-19 (1994) (homicide).
279. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.2661-.2665 (creating a unique crime for
terminating a fetus outside the abortion context); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-37 (same).
280. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807.
281. See id.
282. All other things may not be equal, however, for the removal of the quasi-
third party's interests from the balance may also, in the case of a competent individ-
ual, expel the State's interest in protecting life from the process of balancing com-
peting interests. See infra notes 299-318 and accompanying text. For the purposes of
the following analysis, however, the existence of an unqualified State interest in the
preservation of life, Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282
(1990), will be assumed to be in conflict with the individual liberty in question.
283. Compare supra note 3 (listing the interests justifying the RTDWD) with su-
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to a previability abortion, the exercise of the RTDWD also re-
quires morally controversial medical assistance. Third, this as-
sistance, in the form of PAS or PCE, is obtained for the purpose
of terminating a life-albeit the life of the individual exercising
the right rather than the potential life of the fetus. In the con-
text of the RTDWD, everything else is equal except that the
conflicting interests of a quasi-third party are absent. Because
the combination of the State's interest in potential life and the
presence of a quasi-third party does not outweigh a woman's
right to obtain a previability abortion, 4 the State's interest in
the protection of life alone cannot outweigh an individual's right
to medical assistance in the process of dying, which does not
involve the interests of a third or quasi-third party.
The Court's decision in Cruzan confirms this reading of the
implications of the right to a previability abortion, for at least
five Justices explicitly argued that a state's interest in protect-
ing life cannot override entirely an individual's liberty interest
in hastening his own death.m5 The only difference remaining
between the RTDWD and the right recognized in Cruzan is the
manner in which the individual can exercise her right to hasten
death.
A comparison of the RTDWD with the conduct protected by
the RTD and a woman's right to a previability abortion indicates
that distinguishing between the methods used to hasten death is
constitutionally insignificant."5 The decisions in Casey and
Cruzan, both of which supported liberties involving medical
assistance, have already protected the type of conduct underly-
pra notes 232-57 and accompanying text (discussing the interests justifying the
previability abortion right).
284. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807.
285. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 288-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 304-05
(Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 350 (Stevens, J., dissenting); supra notes 34-42 and
accompanying text.
286. See Sedler, supra note 209, at 787-88 ("No principled difference can be found
in the applicable constitutional doctrine . . . ."); supra note 30. But see Yale
Kamisar, Are Laws Against Assisted Suicide Unconstitutional?, HASTINGS CENTIER
REP., May-June 1993, at 32, 33-34. Because it is able to rationally unify two related
liberties, this position is consistent with Justice Harlan's substantive due process
theory. See supra notes 109-40 and accompanying text. For a discussion of why the
distinction between the RTD and the RTDWD is, nevertheless, a powerful one, see
infra note 370.
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ing the RTDWD. With respect to the previability abortion right,
the physician's role in performing an abortion is very similar to
a doctor's role in PAS or PCE. 7 Regarding the RTD, the role
of a physician in discontinuing medical treatment is both causal-
ly' and ethically 9 identical to the role of a doctor assisting
in a patient's suicide or committing euthanasia-in each case
the physician is acting to end an individual's life."' The con-
duct underlying the RTDWD therefore falls within the constitu-
tionally protected sphere of liberty requiring medical assistance
in the termination of life or potential life. Consequently, this
right is entitled to constitutional protection.29'
287. See supra notes 270-80 and accompanying text.
288. See James Rachels, Active and Passive Euthanasia, 292 NEw ENG. J. MED.
78, 80 (1975); John A. Robertson, Cruzan and the Constitutional Status of
Nontreatment Decisions for Incompetent Patients, 25 GA. L. REV. 1139, 1176-77 (1991)
("[I]f the competent patient has a right to cause her death passively by refusing
medical care, then her right to kill herself by active means should logically follow as
should her right to have the assistance of others in pursuing that end."); Tom Stacy,
Euthanasia and the Supreme Court's Competing Conceptions of Religious Liberty, 10
ISSUES L. & MED. 55, 64-65 (1994) ( The distinction between active and passive
euthanasia, although meaningful to some, is at bottom unpersuasive. Physician-as-
sisted suicide, active euthanasia, and passive euthanasia all involve a person's fol-
lowing a course of action or inaction that the person knows is substantially certain
to cause death."); Dan W. Brock, Voluntary Active Euthanasia, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 10, 12-14. The acts of disconnecting a respirator and inject-
ing a patient's intravenous tube with a lethal dosage of drugs, for example, are
different, but equivalent, means of hastening death, for they require the same degree
of physician involvement in the process of dying. The distinction between the right
to have medical treatment discontinued and the right to PAS is also unsound be-
cause PAS requires less physician involvement in the process of dying than the dis-
connection of a respirator or feeding tube.
289. There is no moral distinction between the discontinuation of a patient's treat-
ment by a doctor and the processes of PAS and PCE, unless the latter actions are
viewed as morally superior because they more effectively diminish suffering and
enhance autonomy and dignity. See Rachels, supra note 288, at 80.
290. See supra notes 270-80, 288 and accompanying text; infira notes 371-77 and
accompanying text.
291. See TRIBE & DORF, supra note 224, at 78 ("The lesson of Justice Harlan's
Poe dissent applies no less to the enterprise of connecting cases than it does to that
of connecting clauses of the Constitution.").
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The Right To Die with Dignity Fits Comfortably Within the
Principle Unifying Constitutionally Protected Liberties
The principle unifying the Supreme Court's liberty jurispru-
dence provides additional support for the RTDWD. Invoking
Justice Harlan's view that the purposes and interpretation of
specific liberties enumerated in the Constitution are representa-
tive of a "rational continuum" of constitutionally protected
conduct,292 the Court's opinion in Casey articulated a principle
that unified the rights and interests currently protected by the
liberty of the Due Process Clause and described the nature of
rights that would be entitled to future judicial protection.293
The Court stated:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty
is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of mean-
ing, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs
about these matters could not define the attributes of
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the
State.294
The RTDWD implicates every aspect of liberty's rational con-
tinuum because it is supported by an individual's interests in
self-determination, autonomy, bodily integrity, dignity, and the
mitigation of suffering.295 These interests and the conduct they
protect, moreover, have consistently been afforded constitutional
protection.296 The RTDWD, therefore, is entirely consistent
with the Court's development of our constitutional purposes and
may be the matter most central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
292. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2811 (1992).
293. See id. at 2807.
294. Id.
295. See supra notes 233-69 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 233-91 and accompanying text.
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The Evolving Balance Between Individual Liberty and State
Authority Expressed in This Nation's Practices and Laws
At any moment in time, American laws and practices reflect a
societal view of the proper balance between individual liberty
and State authority.297 As such, they comprise one aspect of
our larger constitutional tradition. These laws and practices,
however, are not static, nor are they the product of a single
generation or moment in time. Rather, the laws and practices of
our society are situated within an evolutionary process that
began with the adoption of the Constitution. The task of an
advocate of an unenumerated liberty, therefore, is twofold.
First, she must identify the relevant strands of this evolu-
tionary process, understanding that the "reasons that animate
a tradition are more important than that tradition's bare
existence."29 Second, she must demonstrate that the rela-
tionship between State authority and individual liberty posit-
ed by her unenumerated liberty is sufficiently compatible
with these strands to be considered part of our larger consti-
tutional tradition.
Three aspects of this constitutional tradition are relevant to
the RTDWD. First, the legal history of suicide demonstrates that
the State's interest in protecting life is not in conflict with the
RTDWD. Second, the development of statutory and judicial
protections for the RTD reflects this conception of the State's
interest in protecting life by recognizing that an individual can
rationally choose to hasten his own death and has a right to do
so. Third, although euthanasia is currently proscribed in every
state, and assisted suicide is criminalized in many, the impact of
these laws is diminished by the presence of RTD legislation, two
societal practices,, and the countermajoritarian power of an
individual's interest in mitigating suffering.
The Legal History of Suicide
Although suicide was initially an ecclesiastical offense, by the
fourteenth century it became a felony in England. 9 Ironically,
297. See LOCKE, supra note 218, at 184-85.
298. Stacy, supra note 288, at 67.
299. Maria T. CeloCruz, Aid-in-Dying: Should We Decriminalize Physician-Assisted
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if the person survived the attempt,"' their crime was punish-
able by death."1 Because punishment and deterrence were not
furthered by criminalizing suicide, the primary purpose of the
crime was to raise revenue for the State through the creation of
a new class of felons subject to asset forfeiture.0 2
The conception of suicide as a crime was later replaced by the
view that suicide was the act of a mentally ill and irrational
individual."3 A survivor of a suicide attempt, therefore, re-
quired treatment rather than punishment.3 4 Consequently,
although a government expresses its interest in protecting life
by discouraging suicide, attempted suicide is not punished crimi-
nally in the United States today. 05
Because the State's interest in discouraging suicide is inter-
twined with the assumption that an attempted suicide is the
product of irrationality and mental illness,06 the State's inter-
est in discouraging suicide decreases substantially when a com-
petent. 7 individual makes an informed decision to commit sui-
cide."' In fact, the State's interest decreases to the point at
which the State's interest in protecting life does not conflict with
a competent individual's decision to commit suicide. The State's
interest, therefore, cannot outweigh that individual liberty."'
Suicide and Physician-Committed Euthanasia?, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 369, 373 (1992).
300. WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 275.
301. CeloCruz, supra note 299, at 373.
302. WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 274; CeloCruz, supra note 299, at 373-75.
303. CeloCruz, supra note 299, at 375.
304. Id.
305. Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
306. See CeloCruz, supra note 299, at 375.
307. For a definition of competency, see infra notes 379-87 and accompanying
text.
308. See CeloCruz, supra note 299, at 376.
309. See id. The Court's articulation of the principle linking its cases on abortion
to its cases on the right to refuse medical treatment-that the State's interest in life
cannot entirely override individual liberty, see supra note 270 and accompanying
text-may therefore stand for two analytically distinct propositions. With respect to
abortion, the principle suggests that the State's interest in life conflicts with, but
cannot outweigh, the individual liberty involved. In the context of the RTDWD, how-
ever, this principle suggests a tautology: a State interest that does not conflict with
an individual liberty cannot outweigh that individual liberty. Alternatively, if one
assumes that a state's interest in protecting life conflicts with a competent
individual's decision to commit suicide, the history of this interest, when compared
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This conception of the relationship between the State's inter-
est in protecting life and a competent individual's liberty accords
with the right to life protected by the Constitution. Recalling the
political philosophy of Locke, government is instituted by indi-
viduals because of the threat others pose to the enjoyment of life
and liberty.31 Individual rights in this system of government
are based on the notion that an individual has the right to be
left alone and that others have a duty to leave him alone.311 As
a result, the right to life is a right to be protected from oth-
ers-the right to be free from nonconsensual harms. 2
Suicide is a "harm" to self. Both competent and incompetent
individuals can commit this harm.31 When an incompetent
person commits suicide, the act is a nonconsensual harm to self
because, absent improper influences, such as a major mental
illness, the person would probably forego suicide.314 Conse-
quently, the act of suicide by an incompetent individual can be
envisioned as the infliction of harm on another-the competent
self.3 1
5
In the context of suicide, the State's interest in life protects
the competent self from the incompetent self.36 When a compe-
tent individual reaches the decision to commit suicide, however,
the State's interest in protecting life is not implicated because
there is no conceptual basis for finding the infliction of a
nonconsensual harm on another.1 When viewed in the context
to the Court precedent supporting individual liberty, suggests that it is not powerful
enough to abridge the RTDWD. The remainder of this Note, however, will treat the
State's interest in protecting life and a competent person's right to control the cir-
cumstances surrounding his own death as harmonious interests.
310. See LOCKE, supra note 218, at 184.
311. See id. at 122-24; see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (stating that the right to be "let alone" is the most
comprehensive of individual rights).
312. See NORMAN L. CANTOR, ADVANCE DIRECTIVES AND THE PURSUIT OF DEATH
WITH DIGNITY 9 (1993).
313. See infra notes 379-89 and accompanying text.
314. See David C. Clark, "Rational" Suicide and People with Terminal Conditions
or Disabilities, 8 ISSUES L. & MED. 147, 154 (1992).
315. See CeloCruz, supra note 299, at 375-76.
316. See id.
317. See id.; cf. Franklin G. Miller & John C. Fletcher, The Case for Legalized
Euthanasia, 36 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. 159, 162 (1993) (stating that practicing
voluntary euthanasia is not surrendering to the control of others).
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of an individual's right to life, the legal history of suicide indi-
cates that a state has no legitimate interest in preventing a
competent individual from exercising the RTDWD.315
Statutory Protection for the Right of a Previously Competent
Individual To Refuse or Discontinue Medical Treatment
Modern medicine has radically altered the way we die, and
the fields of law and medicine have responded slowly to the
needs of competent patients who face the prospect of incurable
suffering or terminal illness.319 Regrettably, the law has been
even slower to respond to, and in many cases has been less pro-
tective of, the rights of the previously competent.2 ° Nonethe-
less, all but four states offer some form of statutory protection
for a previously competent individual's decision to refuse medical
treatment. 321 Although this legislation is inadequate in many
instances, 322 it suggests that the balance between individual
318. See CeloCruz, supra note 299, at 376.
319. There is, however, little need for legislative enactments regarding the right
of a presently competent individual to refuse medical treatment. See supra notes 27-
42 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, many living will statutes indicate that a
presently competent individual can refuse medical treatment or have it withdrawn at
any time. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7185.5(a) (West Supp. 1995).
320. As a result of their age, mental disability, or physical condition, some people
are always rendered incompetent. Because these people can never decide voluntarily
to hasten death, law and medicine should be very hesitant to include these individu-
als within the class of people qualifying for the RTDWD.
321. See infra note 323 and accompanying text. The federal government has also
demonstrated a commitment to the rights of the previously competent by requiring
hospitals that receive Medicaid and Medicare funds to provide their patients with
information about the state law regarding advanced directives. 42 U.S.C. §
1395cc(f)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. V 1993).
322. Because this legislation, in many cases, distinguishes between the rights of
the presently and previously competent, it may be unconstitutional after Cruzan. The
four dissenting opinions argued that the RTD is not forfeited when an individual is
rendered incompetent but that it, in fact, remains constant in its scope. See supra
notes 39-42. Justice O'Connor, however, did not specifically address the issue of
whether the rights of a previously competent individual were narrower in scope than
those of a presently competent individual. See supra note 37. Nonetheless, she indi-
cated that a state could be constitutionally required "to implement the decisions of a
patient's duly appointed surrogate." Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497
U.S. 261, 292 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring). This position is consistent with the
principle that the right to refuse medical treatment remains constant for both com-
petent and incompetent individuals. See infra note 332 and accompanying text.
884
RIGHT TO DIE WITH DIGNITY
liberty and State authority currently reflected in our law is simi-
lar to the balance contemplated by the RTDWD.
Forty-six states and the District of Columbia currently have
statutes allowing individuals to draft living wills.3" These stat-
utes demonstrate a societal recognition that "an adult ... has
the fundamental right to control the decisions relating to the
rendering of his... own medical care, including the decision to
have life-sustaining treatment withheld or withdrawn in in-
stances of a terminal condition or permanent unconscious condi-
tion."324 Although the basic premise underlying each statute is
that a person has a right, when competent, to make decisions
about the course of his medical treatment should he become in-
competent,325 the states vary in the protection that they afford
this right. Every state with living will legislation protects, at a
minimum, a previously competent individual's decision to with-
hold or withdraw medical treatment3 26 in the event of terminal
illness,327  provided that the living will was validly
executed.32 Thirteen states, however, do not require the indi-
vidual to be terminally ill in order to refuse medical treat-
ment,3 29 and they will enforce the living will of a person in a
persistent vegetative state.30
Perhaps as a response to the limitations of living will stat-
utes, more than thirty states allow an individual to appoint
someone, a surrogate, to make her post-competence health care
323. See CANTOR, supra note 312, at 33; JAMES M. HOEFLER & BRIAN E. KAiOIE,
DEATtIRIGHT: CULTURE, MEDICINE, POLITICS, AND THE RIGHT To DIE 193 (1994).
324. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7185.5(a) (West Supp. 1995). This right is
predicated on an individuars interests in autonomy, dignity, and the mitigation of
suffering. Id. § 7185.5(c)-(d).
325. See CANTOR, supra note 312, at 34. For both the RTD and the RTDWD, a
presently incompetent individual who did not express his intent regarding post-com-
petency health care decisions while competent-through a living will, appointment of
a surrogate, or other approved method-has waived his right to any medical assis-
tance in hastening his death.
326. Six states prohibit the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration. Id. at 39. Such
a position may be unconstitutional after Cruzan. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 288-89
(O'Connor, J., concurring); supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
327. See CANTOR, supra note 312, at 35. This requirement may also be uncon-
stitutional after Cruzan. See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
328. See CANTOR, supra note 312, at 33-34.
329. HOEFLER & KAMIOIE, supra note 323, at 195.
330. See id.
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decisions.331 These devices are flexible, in many cases allowing
a surrogate "to make the same range of decisions ... that the
principal could make if competent.""3 2 Legislation allowing the
appointment of surrogates therefore harmonizes the rights of
presently and previously competent individuals in several states
by eliminating the proximity to death requirement that exists in
many living will statutes.
The statutorily protected right to refuse medical treatment is
the current manifestation of an evolving legal movement that
protects many of the essential components of the RTDWD. For
example, the interests protected by the previously competent
person's right to refuse treatment are identical to those underly-
ing the RTDWD.333 Moreover, by protecting these interests
through the formulation of a right to refuse medical treatment,
society has endorsed the principle that a person can rationally
and competently choose to hasten death,33 thereby bolstering
the conclusions drawn from a careful analysis of Cruzan. Be-
cause the effectuation of this principle requires medical assis-
tance, such as the removal of a feeding tube or the disconnection
of a respirator, the policies animating RTD legislation also pro-
tect other forms of medical assistance in dying, including PCE,
which is an essential element of the RTDWD and the constitu-
tional equivalent of the conduct protected by the RTD 35 Final-
ly, although the RTD legislation is sometimes inconsistent with
respect to the rights of competent and previously competent
individuals, it demonstrates that the evolving societal conception
of the balance between individual liberty and State authority
331. CANTOR, supra note 312, at 42. This arrangement grants the surrogate
durable power of attorney over health care decisions for the presently incompetent
individual.
332. Id. at 43.
333. Compare CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7185.5(c) (West Supp. 1995) (pro-
viding that, in the interest of protecting individual autonomy, prolonging the process
of dying in some circumstances may violate patient dignity) with supra note 12
(articulating the interests underlying the RTDWD). Statutory law, common law, and
the Constitution protect an individual's interests in dignity, autonomy, bodily integri-
ty, and the mitigation of suffering.
334. The RTD statutes, in effect, presume competency. See CANTOR, supra note
312, at 25-32.
335. See supra notes 285-91 and accomhpanying text; infra notes 369-77 and ac-
companying text.
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currently is tipped in favor of the RTDWD because society recog-
nizes circumstances in which a person's right to hasten her
death does not conflict with the State's interest in protecting
life.
The Legal Status of Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia
The occasional differences in statutory protection for the
rights of previously and presently competent individuals indicate
that societal views are not always applied consistently. Criminal
laws barring assisted suicide and euthanasia are evidence of this
conundrum because they not only are inconsistent with the
interests underlying a right already protected by society, the
RTD, but they also highlight the difference between a law as
written and as enforced. These criminal prohibitions cannot,
standing alone, prevent the RTDWD from being considered part
of our living constitutional tradition.
State law is not protective of the conduct comprising the
RTDWD. Throughout the United States, euthanasia is treated
as murder, 6 and the "victim's" consent is not a defense. 37
Assisted suicide is banned by statute in thirty-two states and
proscribed by common law in twelve states and the District of
Columbia.' In six states, the legal status of assisted suicide is
unclear.3 9
Several societal practices undermine the force of these laws.
To begin with, the crime of assisting suicide is a legal anomaly.
A person assisting in the commission of a crime is normally
charged with the crime itself through an aiding and abetting
theory of liability. According to this theory, a person who assists
in the commission of a suicide should be charged with the crime
of suicide. Suicide, however, is not a crime,30 and no legal the-
ory of liability can criminalize the assistance of a legal act. In-
stead, the unique theoretical status of the crime of assisting sui-
cide is based on an innovative approach to the principles of crim-
336. CeloCruz, supra note 299, at 380.
337. Id.
338. HOEFLER & KAMOME, supra note 323, at 144.
339. Id.
340. See Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78, 84 (SD.N.Y. 1994).
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inal liability. Such innovation, however, signals the potential for
conflict with other precepts of our law.
The interests underlying the RTDWD are statutorily protected
by the right to refuse or discontinue medical treatment. None-
theless, many of the states that protect the right to refuse medi-
cal treatment in its broadest sense also criminalize euthanasia
and assisted suicide," 1 even when these acts involve a doctor
and a competent, consenting patient. These two positions cannot
be reconciled, for sweeping bans on assisted suicide and eutha-
nasia undermine important individual interests already protect-
ed by state law. These bans also represent arbitrary restrictions
on the means available to an individual who wishes to hasten
his own death and are unsupported by the State's interest in
protecting life. As a result, the import of these laws as a legal
tradition is limited, particularly when one considers how they
are enforced.
In the United States, approximately 6,000 deaths each day
are planned.342 Many of these deaths occur with the help of
doctors who administer increasing amounts of pain-relieving
drugs to alleviate a patient's suffering.343 These increasing dos-
es, however, have the "double effect" of hastening a patient's
death.3 4 Although this medical assistance constitutes euthana-
sia, it is rarely prosecuted as murder.45 This lack of enforce-
341. Compare HOEFLER & KAMOIE, supra. note 323, at 145 (charting 32 states
that explicitly criminalize assisted suicide, 12 states in which the common law
criminalizes it, and six states in which its status is unclear) with id. at 195 (ex-
plaining that while 44 states criminalize assisted suicide through statute or common
law, states have enacted statutes that permit the withdrawal of life support under
certain conditions) and id. at 197 (charting the states with provisions for the ap-
pointment of surrogates and proxy decisionmakers) and id. at 201 (noting the diver-
sity among the states regarding the withholding or withdrawing of artificial nutrition
and hydration).
342. See Quill et al., supra note 14, at 1381.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Fifty-six prosecutions for mercy killings were brought in the United States
between 1920 and 1985, and many of these cases did not involve doctors. IIOEFLER
& KAMOI, supra note 323, at 164. Thirty-five defendants were convicted, but only
10 were imprisoned. Id. Fifteen defendants were acquitted. Id. Charges were dis-
missed against six. Id. Five others were not even brought to trial. Id. Moreover,
as evidenced by the refusal of a New York grand jury to indict Dr. Quill for as-
sisting in the suicide of Diane, laws against assisted suicide will also not be en-
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ment against doctors, when coupled with the inconsistency of
these laws and other statutory protections and the statutorily
protected RTD, militates against the conclusion that the societal
balance between individual liberty and State authority does not
protect the RTDWD.
The Evolving Balance Between Individual Liberty and State
Authority Supports the Right To Die with Dignity
The three legal traditions illustrating the societal balance
between the individual liberty to hasten death and the State's
authority to interfere with that liberty suggest that the RTDWD
is within the conduct protected by this balance. In its current
form, this balance indicates that the State has no interest in
preventing a competent individual from hastening her own
death. This balance also reflects widespread societal protection
for the interests underlying the RTDWD and an individual's
right to hasten her own death with medical assistance. Evaluat-
ed in light of these societal judgments, the unenforced laws
criminalizing every instance of assisted suicide and euthanasia
cannot tilt the balance toward a societal recognition that govern-
ment can legitimately proscribe the RTDWD.346 Although addi-
tional state laws such as Oregon's Measure 16 would strengthen
this conclusion, they are not necessary because the societal bal-
ance is informed by an examination of the practices and purpos-
es that shape existing laws and by an evolutionary perspective
on the path of the law.4
forced against doctors assisting in the voluntary death of a competent patient. See
id. at 150.
346. Although the irreconcilable conflict between laws protecting the RTD and
laws proscribing assisted suicide and euthanasia is enough to prevent the tipping of
the balance toward government authority, the additional conflict between these re-
strictive laws and the constitutionally protected interest in the mitigation of suffer-
ing guarantees that the balance will not tip toward the State. See supra notes 254,
263-69 and accompanying text.
347. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 544 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Without
this perspective, the Due Process Clause would be reduced to a constitutional redun-
dancy. See supra notes 109-23, 185 and accompanying text.
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The Right To Die with Dignity Is Embedded in Our Living
Constitutional Tradition
The shared aspects of our living constitutional tradition indi-
cate that the RTDWD is entitled to constitutional protection. To
begin with, the political theory underlying our Constitution
suggests that one of the primary purposes of government is to
protect individual liberties, particularly those that do not inter-
fere with the liberty of others. This purpose manifests itself in a
theory of constitutional interpretation and judicial review that
views the Bill of Rights as an illustration of a larger sphere of
individual liberty that the federal courts have a constitutional
duty to protect. An application of this constitutional theory to
the right to life and its relationship to suicide, as well as the
protection afforded the RTD by the Constitution, the states, and
the common law, indicates that the State's interest in life cannot
prevent a competent individual from hastening her own death.
Moreover, because the interests and conduct underlying the
RTDWD are identical to those protected by the RTD and be-
cause these interests and conduct have received independent
constitutional protection, our living constitutional tradition must
be viewed as incorporating the right of a person to control the
circumstances surrounding her death. The RTDWD, therefore,
represents a point on liberty's continuum because it is grounded
on the shared aspects of our living constitutional tradition.
PROTECTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT To DIE WITH DIGNITY
. Deriving the RTDWD, however, does not end the constitution-
al inquiry. The boundaries of this right must be defined through
a balancing process, and the burdens imposed on this right must
be weighed against the interests supporting these legislatively
enacted encumbrances. This section will demonstrate that a
state cannot constitutionally ban the RTDWD, impose a proximi-
ty to death requirement on its exercise, or allow PAS while pro-
hibiting PCE. A state does, however, possess broad authority to
ensure competency in those exercising the RTDWD.
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Legitimate State Interests Implicated by the Right To Die with
Dignity
The State's compelling interest in protecting life does not con-
flict with the right of a competent individual to hasten her own
death.348 This interest does, however, allow a state to adopt
procedures designed to prevent an incompetent person from
hastening his own death, provided that the rights of competent
individuals are not thereby overly burdened.
Protecting third parties from the exercise of individual liberty
is also a legitimate State interest.349 Because courts have con-
sistently held that this State interest cannot outweigh an
individual's RTD,' ° the interest in protecting third parties
cannot be viewed as outweighing an individual's RTDWD 1
and will not be treated as an interest underlying legislation
addressing the RTDWD." 2
The State also has a legitimate interest in protecting the in-
tegrity of the medical profession. 3 Like the State's interest in
protecting third parties, this interest is incapable of outweighing
the RTD354 and consequently is incapable of outweighing the
RTDWD 55 Like the State's interest in preventing harm to
third parties, this interest will not be viewed as supporting regu-
lations impacting on the RTDWD.
348. See supra notes 299-318 and accompanying text. To the extent that a state
can demonstrate an interest in preserving the sanctity of life, this concern is sub-
sumed within its interest in protecting life. See Stephen A. Newman, Euthanasia:
Orchestrating "The Last Syllable of. . . Time," 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 153, 174 (1991).
349. See supra notes 310-12 and accompanying text.
350. See, e.g., In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 411-12 (N.J. 1987).
351. See supra notes 270, 309 and accompanying text.
352. The rejection of spousal notification provisions in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2830 (1992), indicates that this type of interest cannot out-
weigh an individual's RTDWD.
353. See, e.g., Farrell, 529 A.2d at 411.
354. Id. at 411-12.
355. This conclusion is strengthened by a consideration of society's acceptance of
the double effect technique and the failure of this State interest to support permissi-
ble regulations of the right to a previability abortion. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2821.
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Laws Proscribing Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia
Laws prohibiting assisted suicide and euthanasia completely
abridge the RTDWD. The abridgement of a constitutionally
protected liberty will be outweighed only upon a showing that
the proscription is narrowly tailored to effectuate a compelling
State interest.356 The State does not have a compelling interest
in preventing a competent individual from hastening her own
death. Although blanket prohibitions on assisted suicide and
euthanasia also prevent incompetent individuals from harming
themselves, they are not narrowly tailored approaches that fur-
ther the State's interest in ensuring competency because they
deny individuals an opportunity to demonstrate competency.
Laws banning all acts of assisted suicide and euthanasia are
therefore unconstitutional.357
356. See supra note 132.
357. A state might argue that exceptions for competent individuals are not pre-
conditions for meeting the narrowly tailored requirement because competent individu-
als do not commit suicide. See supra note 303 and accompanying text. An irrebutta-
ble presumption, however, is an indication of improper tailoring, see, e.g., Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199-204 (1976), and is difficult for a state to sustain, see
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979) (plurality opinion) (stating that a minor
is constitutionally entitled to a proceeding where she can demonstrate "that she is
mature enough and well enough informed to make her abortion decision, in consulta-
tion with her physician"); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)
(striking down a statute that conclusively presumed unmarried minors to be incapa-
ble of consenting to abortion procedures).
In this case, the presumption would be disingenuous in light of the recognition
by 46 states and the District of Columbia that an individual can rationally choose to
hasten his death. See HOEFLER & KAMOIE, supra note 323, at 193. Moreover, psy-
chological evidence suggesting that a minimum of six to twelve percent of all sui-
cides have been committed by competent individuals would contradict the presump-
tion. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 314, at 153; Conwell & Caine, supra note 14, at
1101. These studies, however, were based either on the medical records of mental
patients who committed suicide or on the psychological profiles of
noninstitutionalized individuals who committed suicide, Clark, supra note 314, at
150, rather than on the profiles of individuals who committed suicide when confront-
ed with an incurable illness or form of suffering, id. at 151-53. If the individuals
involved in the 6,000 planned deaths that occur each day in this country, see Quill
et al., supra note 14, at 1381, were profiled, the percentage of suicides committed by
competent individuals would undoubtedly be greater than six to twelve percent. Al-
though additional psychological evidence on the terminally ill would be helpful in
evaluating legislation impacting on the RTDWD, see infra notes 379-89 and accompa-
nying text, a conclusive presumption that denies competent individuals their RTDWD
is unconstitutional because it is not narrowly tailored.
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Defining the Right To Die with Dignity To Include Only the
Terminally Ill or Those with Less Than Six Months To Live
Many advocates of PAS argue that it is a right possessed
exclusively by the terminally ill.35 This position is a common
one, for all legislative proposals for a right to PAS have restrict-
ed its availability to those with less than six months to live." 9
Because both of these related limitations on the RTDWD are
unconstitutional restrictions on the class of individuals capable
of exercising the RTDWD, they will be treated as identical regu-
lations in the following analysis.50
Restricting the class of people possessing the RTDWD to those
with less than six months to live is a perversion of the State's
interest in protecting life. It implies that the State's interest in
protecting life depends on the remaining life span of the individ-
ual to be protected; thus, the State's interest begins to decrease
immediately after an individual is born. The State's interest in
protecting an individual's life, however, is compelling as long as
that person wishes to continue living; it does not diminish with
age or proximity to death.
Defining the RTDWD as contingent upon an individuars re-
maining life span can only be explained as an irrebuttable pre-
sumption regarding competency. Individuals with more than six
months to live are conclusively presumed incapable of compe-
tently deciding to hasten death, whereas those with less than six
months to live are given an opportunity to demonstrate compe-
tency. Evaluating this restriction within a substantive due pro-
358. See, e.g., Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1464 (W.D.
Wash. 1994), rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.), reh'g en banc granted, 62 F.3d 299 (9th
Cir. 1995); Wanzer et al., supra note 14. But see Quill et al., supra note 14, at 1381
(arguing that those with incurable illnesses and those who are suffering possess a
right to commit PAS).
359. See MODEL DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT § 1.02(j), in HuMPHRY, supra note 90,
at 135; Penrose, supra note 87, at 711-15 (discussing California Proposition 161 and
Washington Ballot Initiative 119); supra note 64 and accompanying text.
360. Conceptually, however, they are not identical. If the term "terminally ill" has
meaning, it is only through a reference to an expected time of death. Cf. CANTOR,
supra note 312, at 36-38 (arguing that "terminally ill" is a term that cannot be
defined); Marzen, supra note 210, at 814-19 (same). In one sense, therefore, a termi-
nal illness requirement is not a limit on the class of individuals eligible to commit
PAS because everyone is terminally ill.
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cess framework36 indicates that the restriction is unconstitu-
tional because the burden that it places on the RTDWD out-
weighs the State's poorly tailored effort to ensure competency.
In the balancing of interests, the State is attempting to fur-
ther its interest in ensuring competency by conclusively presum-
ing that those with more than six months to live are incompe-
tent. This presumption, however, has no foundation in the medi-
cal understanding of competency"' and is entirely arbitrary.
Moreover, this irrebuttable presumption conflicts with the con-
stitutional right to refuse treatment that allows a person to
hasten death regardless of her remaining life span.363
The burden that this regulation places on the RTDWD is
twofold. First, it operates as a ban on the RTDWD for those with
more than six months to live. Second, a proximity to death re-
quirement is a quality of life determination made by the govern-
ment indicating that the lives of those with more than six
months to live are too meaningful to be ended by PAS or PCE,
but not so valuable that they cannot choose to starve or suffo-
cate to death, regardless of their underlying medical condi-
tion." This presumption violates every constitutionally pro-
tected interest underlying the RTDWD.365
The burden placed on a competent individual's RTDWD by a
proximity to death requirement is severe. In order to outweigh
this burden, the government regulation must be narrowly tai-
lored to further a compelling State interest. With respect to a
proximity to death limitation on the RTDWD, however, the
State cannot meet this burden. Although the State's interest in
361. Although this classification may violate equal protection guarantees, it will
be treated as a violation of substantive due process. See supra note 135 and accom-
panying text. The Equal Protection Clause, however, remains an important constitu-
tional provision for an advocate of the RTDWD, particularly in circumstances in
which Justice Harlan's theory is not employed.
362. See supra note 357.
363. See supra 27-42; see also supra notes 319-35 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing various statutory protections for the RTD). The following analysis also applies to
the proximity to death restrictions contained in these statutes.
364. Cf. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1990) (ap-
proving a state's decision not to become involved in quality of life determinations).
365. See Quill et al., supra note 14, at 1381; supra note 12 and accompanying
text.
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ensuring competency is compelling, the proximity to death re-
quirement is not tailored to effectuate this purpose because it
arbitrarily denies individuals with more than six months to live
an opportunity to demonstrate competency.
Defining the Right To Die with Dignity To Include Physician-
Assisted Suicide But Not Physician-Committed Euthanasia
Advocates of PAS have also attempted to limit the scope of the
emerging RTDWD by distinguishing between assisted suicide
and euthanasia."' s This puzzling distinction is based on two
hypothetical implications of PAS: a greater risk of an involun-
tary death and an inappropriate shift in the role of the physi-
cian.67 Such a tenuous distinction within the RTDWD is un-
constitutional.36
The physician's role in committing euthanasia is indistin-
guishable from a physician's role in helping a patient exercise
her right to refuse medical treatment by disconnecting a respira-
tor or feeding tube, and is very similar to a doctor's role in pro-
viding an abortion.369 In cases involving discontinuing treat-
ment and euthanasia, a doctor takes an active role in hastening
the patient's death. An argument against euthanasia based on
the physician's role is not compelling.7"
366. See, e.g., Quill et al., supra note 14, at 1381; supra note 74 and accompany-
ing text.
367. Quill et al., supra note 14, at 1380-81; Wanzer et al., supra note 14, at 849.
If courts or legislators adopt such a distinction, two people identically situated, ex-
cept for their physical capabilities, will not share identical rights. Instead, the per-
son capable of ingesting a lethal dose of chemicals without aid will possess a
RTDWD, whereas the physically incapable person will be forced to hasten death by
refusing medical treatment.
368. Although this classification may also be challenged as a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause, this section will not address that claim. See supra note 135
and accompanying text.
369. See supra notes 270-91 and accompanying text.
370. There may, however, be a powerful emotional difference between withdrawing
medical care and administering a lethal injection. See Brock, supra note 288, at 13.
In addition, many people are unable to distinguish between a killing that is morally
justified and one that is not so justified, despite the widespread acceptance of the
morality of discontinuing treatment and justifying homicides in cases of self-defense.
See id. Doctors, therefore, should not be required to commit euthanasia. See supra
note 65; Quill et al., supra note 14, at 1382.
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If a greater risk of involuntary death arises in situations in-
volving PCE than in those involving PAS, then the State's in-
terest in ensuring that the RTDWD is exercised voluntarily
may justify treating euthanasia differently than PAS. Any
difference in treatment, however, must be balanced against the
burden that it imposes on a physically incapable, yet compe-
tent, individual. Moreover, when this difference constitutes a
ban on a competent person's right, it must be narrowly tailored
to ensure voluntariness. A comparison of euthanasia and the
right to refuse medical treatment demonstrates that banning
PCE is not an appropriately tailored method of promoting vol-
untary conduct.
In at least two situations, an individual's RTDWD depends on
the availability of PCE, and her corresponding right to refuse
medical treatment also depends on medical intervention. In one
instance, an individual may be conscious and competent, yet
physically unable to remove her feeding tube or ingest a lethal
dose of barbiturates without assistance. Similarly, an individual
in a persistent vegetative state is unable to effectuate her own
death without the aid of a physician.
In the first example, the RTD does not depend on the patient's
ability to remove her feeding tube.371 Rather, her right to have
medical treatment withdrawn is identical to an individual's
right to refuse medical treatment, regardless of the risks posed
by the physician's role. Analogously, the RTDWD should not be
contingent upon a person's ability to hasten death without assis-
tance because the risk of an involuntary death posed by a
physician's injection of drugs into an alert and competent
patient's intravenous tube is identical to the risk involved when
a doctor disconnects that person's feeding tube372-- in both in-
stances the patient dictates when the medical assistance will be
rendered and has unlimited opportunities to change her mind
prior to giving this authorization. The risk of physician-commit-
ted involuntary euthanasia is, therefore, very small and already
accepted.373
371. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1144-45 (1986).
372. See Stacy, supra note 288, at 65.
373. Proponents of the slippery slope argument suggest avoiding the acknowledg-
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In the second example, the State can require clear and con-
vincing evidence of the patient's intent to refuse medical treat-
ment in order to reduce the risk of an involuntary death. 74
This evidence is generally provided by the existence of an unre-
yoked -writing that was executed and witnessed while the pres-
ently incompetent individual was competent.375 There is no dif-
ference between requiring a doctor to disconnect a patient's
respirator pursuant to a living will and requiring a doctor to
administer a lethal objection pursuant to the same document.
Any objection to the degree of risk involved in this situation is
thus an objection to the requirements of a valid living will or
durable power of attorney,376 not the actual act of PCE.
The risk of an involuntary request to hasten death is identical
in situations involving the withdrawal of medical treatment and
circumstances surrounding the administration of a lethal injec-
tion. The presence of this risk, however, does not restrict a com-
petent individual's RTD to circumstances involving the refusal of
medical treatment. Consequently, there is no basis for denying a
physically incapable individual the right to PCE while allowing
physically capable individuals to commit PAS. A ban on PCE is
thus not an appropriately tailored means of furthering the
State's interest in ensuring that decisions to hasten death are
voluntary, particularly in light of the State's authority to regu-
late the RTDWD in order to ensure competency.377
ment of the similarities between these two actions because such acknowledgment
would be the first of several inevitable steps toward involuntary euthanasia. See,
e.g., Kamisar, supra note 286, at 36. These arguments, however, tend to underesti-
mate an individual's will to live, as well as the explicitly voluntary nature of the
RTDWD and the likelihood of a substantial number of regulations designed to en-
sure competency.
374. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990).
375. See CANTOR, supra note 312, at 34.
376. The states have the constitutional authority to make these requirements
more effective in ensuring competency. See infra notes 378-89 and accompanying
text.
377. See infra. notes 378-89 and accompanying text. A legislature could, however,
restrict the availability of PCE to those physically incapable of committing PAS
suicide. See Steven J. Wolhandler, Note, Voluntary Active Euthanasia for the Ternzi-
nally III and the Constitutional Right to Privacy, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 363, 368-69
(1984).
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Determining Competency Within the Context of the Right To Die
with Dignity
Regulations designed to ensure that only competent
individuals exercise the RTDWD are the primary expression of
the State's properly defined interest in protecting life. Under the
fundamental tenets of substantive due process, the State pos-
sesses broad authority to regulate pursuant to this interest.3 8
In order to assess the constitutionality of regulations designed to
ensure competency, however, an accurate definition of competen-
cy in the context of the RTDWD must be established.
Competency in the context of the RTDWD is an elusive con-
cept. It is essentially a shorthand reference for a finding that an
individual is reasoning in a rational manner, from fully and
accurately understood premises, and without the presence of
undue influences, including certain types of mental illness.379
An exhaustive inquiry into competency therefore involves three
interrelated encounters with a person wishing to exercise her.
RTDWD. 380
378. See supra notes 124-40 and accompanying text. The "crafting [of) appropriate
procedures for safeguarding . .. liberty interests is entrusted to the 'laboratory' of
the States." Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 292 (O'Connor, J., concurring). But cf Lee v. Ore-
gon, 869 F. Supp. 1491, 1502 (D. Or. 1994) (finding that the public interest and
balance of hardships weigh in favor of maintaining the status quo, while thoroughly
considering the constitutionality of Measure 16).
Nonetheless, competency regulations will be struck down when the burden that
they impose on the RTDWD outweighs the State's tailoring effort. For example, such
an imbalance may result from the enactment of regulations providing doctors with
too much authority over an individuars decision or from the creation of a byzantine
system of competency procedures that delay the exercise of the RTDWD to an extent
that undermines a person's autonomy, bodily integrity, and desire to mitigate suf-
fering. The nature of substantive due process, however, requires that these regula-
tions be carefully evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
379. See Conwell & Caine, supra note 14, at 1101-02; Quill, supra note 256, at
870-73; Quill et al., supra note 14, at 1381-82.
380. Because a state has broad authority to ensure competency by regulation, it
can utilize that .authority in varying degrees. For example, in the RTD context, com-
petency is presumed because a state has the burden of proving incompetency before
it can subject a person to medical treatment for her own protection, see. e.g., ILL.
STAT. ANN. ch. 405, para. 5/1-119, 5/2-107 (West 1993), and a doctor may be liable
in tort for any unwanted medical treatment that he provides, see supra notes 27, 40.
The model of competency that follows is not exclusive; it suggests only the elements
that comprise an exhaustive inquiry into competency. The procedures that states
adopt pursuant to these principles can vary widely.
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Responding to an individual's request for aid in dying is the
first step in the process of determining competency. This request
should not be viewed as the symptom of mental illness nor as an
indication of a reasoned plan.38' Rather, the request should be
viewed as a chance to review the circumstances of that
individual's life. If the person is ill, a doctor should discuss with
him: the nature of his disease; his prognosis; and his treatment
alternatives and their implications, such as palliative and hos-
pice care."'
If, after having received full and accurate information about
his medical circumstances, an individual again requests aid in
dying, the doctor evaluating this request must determine if the
individual is reasoning rationally from accurate premises or
whether the patient is asking to die because of the presence of
undue influences such as coercion or mental illness." 3 In order
to make this determination, a doctor must explore fully with the
patient why death is preferable to continued life, while paying
particular attention to whether the individual is accurately ap-
plying the information given to him by the doctor and whether
his reasons for requesting death are based on the interests un-
derlying the RTDWD or just the interests of others." At the
same time, however, the doctor must also screen for the pres-
ence of a mental illness, such as clinical depression,"' which
381. Clark, supra note 314, at 161; Quill, supra note 256, at 870-73; Quill et al.,
supra note 14, at 1380. Many requests for aid in dying are made by people who
wish to live but have misunderstood the consequences of their illness or the impli-
cations of alternative courses of treatment. See Quill, supra note 256, at 870-72.
382. See Quill, supra. note 256, at 870-73; Quill et al., supra note 14, at 1381-82.
This discussion should include information that will enable the patient to determine
if the consequences of treatment are worth the corresponding impact on his interests
in dignity, self-determination, bodily integrity, and the mitigation of suffering. See
Quill et al., supra note 14, at 1382. For example, a patient may want to know
whether a course of treatment will confine him to a hospital, the level of sedation
that will be required to relieve his suffering, and the effects of a course of treatment
on his body and mind. See Quill, supra. note 256, at 870-73.
383. Quill, supra note 256, at 872; Quill et al., supra note 14, at 1382. At no
time, however, can a physician substitute his judgment for that of the individual.
384. Quill, supra note 256, at 871.
385. The difference between clinical depression and the depression associated with
incurable illness or suffering is subtle, see Conwell & Caine, supra note 14, at 1101,
but important because nonclinical depression does not prevent a person from exercis-
ing rational judgment, see id., and, therefore, the RTDWD.
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could affect a person's rational judgment.38 If the doctor di-
agnoses a mental illness with the potential to affect a
person's judgment, a state could constitutionally prevent that
person from exercising the RTDWD until the illness is prop-
erly treated.87
The process of determining competency suggests that, al-
though the RTDWD appears to be a broad right to suicide, it is a
narrowly defined constitutional liberty based on the important
interests and needs of a limited number of people in our society.
The number of individuals actually exercising the RTDWD will
be small, primarily because of the strength of the human will to
live. 8 For many, then, control over death will be provided by
comfort and hospice care. Furthermore, many who request aid in
dying will be found incompetent because their physical condi-
tions will place them in a class of individuals whose suicidal
impulses correlate to a large extent with the presence of major
psychiatric disorders.389 Finally, additional screening proce-
dures will ensure that those who are ready to leave the woods
are competent to do so.
CONCLUSION
Modern health care has created problems for the law, which is
incapable of growing at a rate equal to that of the medical devel-
opments that it needs to govern. Advancements in medicine
have made it possible for doctors to forecast death and prolong
life. For some, this ability is a blessing. For others, given the
intractable shortcomings of hospice and palliative care, this
ability is a curse. Death was once a matter of fate. Now, it must
be a matter of choice.
The Constitution protects this choice, and the first step to-
ward a constitutional RTDWD is the selection of a substantive
due process theory. This Note has argued that Justice Harlan's
substantive due process framework is the appropriate lens
through which unenumerated liberty claims should be viewed.
386. Id.; see Quill, supra note 256, at 872; Quill et al., supra note 14, at 1382.
387. See supra notes 299-318 and accompanying text.
388. Clark, supra note 314, at 160-61.
389. Id. at 153-55; Conwell & Caine, supra note 14, at 1101.
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Utilizing Justice Harlan's theory, this Note has demonstrated
that constitutional protection for the emerging RTDWD is found
in Supreme Court precedent protecting the interests and conduct
underlying the RTDWD, and that this precedential support is
not diminished, and perhaps is strengthened, by the evolving
balance between individual liberty and State authority that is
expressed in society's laws and practices. Consequently, laws
proscribing the RTDWD, or arbitrarily restricting its scope, are
unconstitutional infringements on a protected liberty.
Although the debate surrounding the RTDWD probably is
incapable of resolution as a religious or philosophical matter, it
can be settled as a question of constitutional law. This Note has
attempted to redefine and advance the debate over the constitu-
tional status of the RTDWD and to demonstrate that a compe-
tent individual, rather than the State, has the constitutional
authority to decide when there is triumph in the ultimate agony.
Brian C. Goebel
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